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SUMMARY 
In this dissertation the literature on suicidal behaviour is reviewed, with particular 
emphasis on professional conceptualizations and understanding as informed by the 
psychiatric and sociological paradigms. Basic postulates of the Ecosystemic paradigm, 
as it is informed by Maturana's second-order cybernetic approach was discussed. The 
effect of such an approach on therapy with suicidal individuals was pointed out. 
It became clear that perceived methodological problems experienced when researching 
suicidal behaviour from a Newtonian/realist paradigm can be side-stepped when viewed 
from an Ecosystemic paradigm. 
It was finally proposed that an ethic of participation, as informed by a second-order 
cybernetic approach, be adopted when viewing the suicide situation. In the process 
ethics was reconceptualized as an awareness of the therapist's participation in whatever 
is created, and not in finding the ''right" way when working 'vith suicidal individuals. 
Key terms: 
Suicidal behaviour; Psychiatric paradigm; Sociological paradigm; Ecosystemic 
paradigm; Second-order cybernetic approach; Ethics of participation; 
Reconceptualization; Methodology of suicide research; Theories of suicide; Ethics; 
Moral issues; Professional liability; Right to suicide. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
As our technology develops, as our populations strain the world economy, as 
alienation becomes part of our existence, and violence in every form confronts mankind, it 
is not surprising that the violence of suicide has become epidemic (Richman, 1986). Still, 
suicide is one of our most powerful taboos. It threatens both our individual connectedness 
with others and also our· collective connection as a social community. Individually and 
collectively our instinct is to avoid the term as a way of distancing ourselves from the 
reality it spells out (Alexander, 1991). Although death has recently become a popular 
subject, a great difficulty can still be seen in thinking about it rigorously in relation to 
psychological theory (Lifton, 1991 ). This can be seen as a symbol of our own conceptual 
denial of death as well as of suicide. 
The proliferation of literature and research regarding the assessment of suicide risk as 
well as the prevention of it emphasize the last statement. Although a lot has been written 
about suicidal behaviour it seems to represent a limited way oflooking at the phenomenon, 
especially with regards to the professional's role in dealing with it. A very definite 
behavioural approach is usually therapeutically prescribed, with assessment and prevention 
as its main aims to the professional. It does not allow any in-depth understanding of 
individual and wider system behaviour and subsequently hampers therapeutic 
maneuverability. This view is held firmly in place by a society that imposes both a moral 
and legal obligation on the clinician to act responsibly. 
It is against this background of limited understanding of suicidal behaviour 
specifically as it includes the clinician, that it was decided to do a theoretical study on the 
implications of an ecosystemic epistemology for understanding suicidal behaviour. The 
idea being, that an epistemology which not only includes the investigation of wider 
systems (including the therapeutic one) but also higher orders of thinking, could illuminate 
this phenomenon. 
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The aim of this dissertation is, therefore, to focus professional and clinical attention on 
suicidal behaviour by means of a theoretical study to eventually illuminate the phenomena. 
This is done because of the following reasons: 
Suicidal behaviour represents the ''ultimate behavioural action" (Wagner, 1997, 
p.246) a therapist sooner or later has to face. 
Although we cannot claim to be the exclusive authority on or guardian against 
suicidal behaviour (Lifton, 1991) societal expectations on our profession to deal 
with it is huge. 
Carnes states that suicidal behaviour is seen by some as the only philosophical 
question worth pursuing (in Diekstra & Moritz, 1987) because it not only addresses 
obvious questions about death but is also concerned with life continuity and the 
meaning of life on all levels (Lifton, 1991 ). 
Suicidal behaviour presents a philosophical question with paradoxical 
characteristics. It is seen by some (Diekstra & Moritz, 1987) as the most supreme 
expression of human freedom as well as the expression of ''hopeless longing to 
regain a lost paradise" (p.8). This characteristic makes it ideal content for 
epistemological evaluation and practices. 
Suicidal behaviour represents an extremely appropriate metaphor for therapists to 
explore their own theoretical biases and informal theories, something which an 
ethic of participation strongly advocates. 
To succeed with the above this dissertation will: 
Bring together the theories historically used to understand suicidal behaviour in 
order to obtain a more comprehensive picture of the current state of theory about 
this phenomenon. This also represents the main aim of this dissertation. Atkinson 
and Heath (1987) propose that we as researchers retrace the distinctions we have 
drawn in constructing a specific pheno:tnenon. This is done so that the reader can 
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do the same. The reader is therefore taught the process of constructing a view. ln 
doing so a more comprehensive picture of the current state of theory about suicidal 
behaviour would be presented. ''To understand any realm of phenomena, we 
should begin by noting how it was constructed, ie., what distinctions underlie its 
creation" (Keeney, 1983a, p.21). ln light ofthis, "research becomes a task of re-
examining (ie., re-searching) what one did to construct a particular reality" 
(Keeney & Morris, 1985, p. 548). Chapter 2 will focus on the theories making up 
the psychiatric paradigm, while Chapter 3 focuses on sociological theories. 
Propose the ecosystemic view on suicidal behaviour as a more appropriate way of 
dealing with this distressing behaviour. Auerswald (1987) says that the 
ecosystemic paradigm is more than a paradigm He descn'bes it as an epistemology 
"sufficiently developed to be used as a basis for solutions of even larger human 
problems" (p.329). This epistemology is also congruent with the new science view 
and provides the basis for a technology of transformation (Auerswald, 1985). It 
would thus be sufficient to be used with the universal problem that suicide 
provides. The ecosystemic paradigm will be presented in Chapter 4. 
Explore various methodological issues regarding research into suicidal behaviour. 
Research into suicidal behaviour as informed by the Newtonian epistemology with 
related methodological problems will be followed by a discussion of the new 
research paradigm in Chapter 5. 
Discuss the ways in which therapists can remain ethical in their therapy with 
suicidal individuals. Maturana (1988) states that the development of ethical 
dilemmas are inevitable if we choose a dialectic approach and become interested in 
the conversation between structure and organization, change and stability, order 
and chaos, subsystem and ecosystem ln Chapter 6 the writer will give a brief 
overview ofthe development of suicidal behaviour and ethics. 
Chapter 7 will point out how this whole endeavor represents an exercise important 
for theory building in the new science paradigm and will also act as a conclusion to 
this dissertation. 
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As can be seen from the above, this review of the literature on suicide will be 
presented as it is subsumed in three paradigms. The specific paradigms will be discussed 
in some detail to contextualize the theories chosen. The Psychiatric paradigm will be 
discussed in Chapter 2, the Sociological paradigm in Chapter 3, and the Ecosystemic 
paradigm in Chapter 4. Although Auerswald (1987) proposes five paradigms specifically 
applicable to family therapy theory, it will not be used here for the following reason. Most 
of social conversation around suicidal behaviour started when there was no formal family 
therapy movement. Because this exercise is part of an ecological understanding of suicidal 
behaviour and because actions by many medical professionals dealing with suicidal 
behaviour is still influenced and informed by the first ( ahhough outdated according to the 
family therapy movement) paradigm, it will be discussed here. The three approaches most 
often used in sociology were chosen because they represent more distinctly the wide range 
of social conversation around suicide. It also represents the epistemological shifts that this 
researcher would want to include in her study. 
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CHAPTER2 
THE PSYCHIATRIC PARADIGM 
2.1 Introduction 
Auerswald (1987, p.321) describes the term '~aradigm" as a "set ofrules .... used 
by a specific group, to define a sub-unit of a universal reality". Dell (1985, p.2) uses 
Scheflen's (1981) more specific definition of paradigm as "a body of theories, methods 
and findings about a particular phenomenon". The three paradigms as well as their 
theories used in this dissertation are included to provide a more holistic view of suicidal 
behaviour. They need not be seen as mutually exclusive but rather as complementary. 
The paradigmatic distinctions used in this dissertation and named in Chapter 1, are not 
clear-cut and would thus not be presented in a rigid way, but rather serve as an attempt 
to present the data in a more orderly fashion. 
The psychiatric or medical paradigm has been the dominant worldview in western 
civilization for many years and focuses on empiricism, with its assumptions about 
external forces of prediction and control (Aarons, 1995). The assumption is that there is 
a real world "out there" and if we are rigorous enough in our observations, we will be 
able to obtain an accurate and objective map of this reality (Atkinson & Heath, 1987). 
An atomistic view of society is held, whereby all phenomena are understood by 
analyzing their separate components. Reality is static and conceptualized through the 
process of reductionism Human behaviour is perceived as independent of context and 
as the result oflineal causes and effects (Schwartzmann, 1985). The focus oftherapy is 
therefore to label the individual intrapsychically, to the exclusion of context, with the 
therapist as an objective observer who has the ability to cause a desired effect. 
2.2 The Psychiatric Paradigm and Suicidal Behaviour 
Explanations of suicide discussed in this section rest on the basic assumption that 
suicide is caused by inherent or acquired qualities ofthe individual concerned. Suicidal 
behaviour is considered qualitatively different from 'normal" behaviour, and this 
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difference is ascribed to the psychological, biological or genetic make-up of a relatively 
small number of people (Erasmus, 1988). Suicidal individuals are seen as born with a 
biological inclination toward depression. Their internal personality needs and drives 
may or may not be able to be expressed within their environment. The cognitive set of 
the individual and his/her thoughts about the current situation can serve to increase or 
decrease suicide susceptibility. In these susceptible people, increased stress can result 
in changes that increase the likelihood of depression. When these chemical changes 
occur, an increase in depression-related cognition may result. Such negative cognition 
may well increase the .subjective impression of stress, which in tum will have a 
continuing effect on the chemistry of the brain (Stillion & McDowell, 1996). It is 
therefore believed that biology, psychology, cognition, or a combination of all three 
intra-individual characteristics produces a suicidal individual. Three different 
perspectives within the psychiatric paradigm will be discussed, pointing out their most 
popular postulates. 
2.2.1 The Biological Perspective 
Winchel, Stanley and Stanley (1990) state that most efforts aimed at identifying 
the potentially suicidal individual focused on demographic, psychosocial, and 
personality factors. Schifano (1994), for example, stresses the use of the ''risk factor" 
model to assist physicians in determining those patients who are most at risk of 
committing suicide. The presence of certain contributory factors like hopelessness, 
impulsiveness, inadequate social support, diminished central serotonin turnover and a 
family history of suicidal behaviour, increases the risk of suicide. Winchel et al. (1990) 
believe that although several of these factors have been found to be associated with 
suicide, they offer too weak a prediction to be of substantial clinical utility. Suicide risk 
indicators tend to overpredict suicide potential, and consequently, many more patients 
are identified falsely as suicide risks (Pokorny, 1983). These observations led them to 
emphasize the importance of finding an approach that examines suicide from a 
biochemical perspective. 
There is no doubt that on the whole the biology of suicides is different from that of 
most nonsuicides. In an edited work by Maris (1986), various contributors claim that 
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there are a dozen or so broad types of major biological differences in suicides compared 
to nonsuicides. These differences come to the fore in the following areas: 
alcoholism (Robins, 1981) 
neurochemical factors (Stanley, Virgilio & Gershon, 1982) 
lutenizing hormones (Dietz, Mendelson & Ellingboe, 1982) 
endocrinology (Rich, 1986) 
menstrual cycle (Young, 1986) 
ECT effects (Tanney, 1986) 
irregular EEGs (Struve, 1986) 
Although major differences have been found in various physiological areas when 
suicides are compared to non-suicides, two major areas have been studied more 
vigorously. These studies involve examining (1) the biological correlates of depression 
and (2) its genetic base. 
Although depression is not synonymous with suicide, most find the relationship 
between the two sufficiently close to justify an examination of the research on the 
biological bases of depression (Stillion & McDowell, 1996). Winchel et al. (1990), 
however, propose that suicidal behaviour should not be seen as a symptom of another 
disorder such as depression or psychosis, but as a disturbance in and of itself They see 
the pharmacological manipulation of the serotonergic system as the logical point at 
which to initiate treatment studies, with the hope that some drug with anti suicidal 
effects that are independent of its antidepressant or antipsychotic effect would be 
discovered. The emergence of drugs that are more specific for the serotonergic system 
(e.g., fluoxetine, citalopram) makes such research more practical. 
Deficiency of serotonin has been found in the brains of some people who have 
completed suicide and in the cerebrospinal fluid of suicide attempters (Asberg, 
Nordstrom, & Traskman-Bendz, 1986). Since serotonin is instrumental in regulating 
emotion, some researchers suggested that a deficiency of serotonin may be implicated 
both in depression and in suicide attempts, especially impulsive suicide attempts. 
Researchers have found that low serotonin, as measured by one of its main metabolic 
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products (5-HIAA), was correlated with both depression and the seriousness of suicide 
attempts (Asberg, Trask:man, & Thoren, 1976; Nordstrom et al., 1994). Furthermore, 
these studies showed that among patients who had been hospitalized in conjunction with 
a suicide attempt those who had less 5-HIAA were more likely to have died from 
suicide a year later than those who had higher levels of the substance. Van Praag 
(1983) notes, however, that the low levels of 5-HIAA in the cerebrospinal fluid of 
depressed patients are more closely related with disturbed aggression regulation (i.e., 
violent suicidal attempts and outwardly directed aggression) than with depressed mood 
perse. 
Although the last studies indicate that the direct biochemical treatment of suicidal 
behaviour unrelated to depression can be foreseen in the near :future, interest in the 
preventive effect of drugs on suicidal behaviour alone has increased only recently 
(Schifano, 1994; Winchel, et al., 1990). Present pharmacological intervention includes 
the use of antipsychotics, benzodiazepines, carbamazepine and lithium, with the use of 
antidepressants as the most popular. How and what biochemical effect antidepressants 
have on suicidal behaviour will be discussed briefly. 
Over the past three decades the pharmaceutical industry has developed three major 
groups of medications for the treatment of unipolar depression. They are monoamine 
oxidase (MAO) inhibitors (e.g., moclobemide}, tricyclics (e.g., amitriptyline) and the 
selective serotonin-reuptake inhibitors (SSRis) (e.g., Prozac). Lithium is also used in 
cases of bipolar or manic-depressive affective disorder. Although each drug has a 
different biochemical effect on the central nervous system, the :functional result is to 
increase the level of serotonin at the synaptic junctions of the neurons in the brain 
(Atkinson, Atkinson & Hilgard, 1983). 
Some clinical observations regarding the use of pharmacological intervention 
should be noted, however. The risk of suicide may increase in the first few days 
following the initiation of antidepressant treatment. This apparent but undocumented 
risk has been speculatively tied to the increased energy and agitation that often occurs 
before the onset of improved mood. Furthermore, patients often use prescribed 
medications to end their lives. A drug overdose is the mechanism of death in 25% of 
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male suicides and 50% of female suicides (Schifano, 1994). Specific biological 
measures may also not ultimately provide very sensitive "markers" for the prediction of 
suicidal behaviour in large numbers of potential attempters. Despite this limitation 
Winchel et al. (1990) still feel that the identification of biological factors associated 
with suicidal behaviour holds promise for the development and application of 
pharmacological treatments as part of suicide prevention. 
A second area of research on the biology of suicide involves examining its genetic 
bases. Blumenthal and. Kupfer (1986) reviewed the literature on family history and 
genetics and reported that the incidence of suicidal behaviour is higher than usual in 
relatives of persons who exhibit suicidal behaviour. Also, the closer these genetic 
relationships are, the higher are the suicide concordance rates. Lester (1986) also found 
that the concordance rate for completed suicide is higher in monozygotic twin pairs 
raised together than in dizygotic twin pairs raised together. While these studies are far 
from definitive, they are suggestive of the biological position that maintains that at least 
a portion of suicidal behaviour may be attributed to genetic traits interacting with 
biology. To conclude this section, Maris (1989, p.453) observed: 
Except in rare instances biology alone does not cause suicide. Suicide is, as 
Schneidman claims, multidimensional. We can all think of individuals with the 
supposed biological profile of suicides who in fact were not suicidal. 
Nevertheless, few suicides do not have the usual biological antecedents 
depression, alcoholism, agedness, maleness, aggressiveness, and so on. 
So where does this perspective leave the professional working with the suicidal 
person? Maris (1989) points out two essential points about suicide that the biomedical 
and existential perspectives share and which illuminate their stance when working with 
people exhibiting suicidal behaviour. Both the biomedical and existential perspectives 
tend to see life problems as empirical and not definitional. Life problems (e.g., suicidal 
behaviour) are therefore "real" and not just considered to be existing in language or 
definitions. They see suicides as sick, not just labeled so or created by doctors and 
medical care. Secondly, they both tend to be skeptical about how much we can do to 
help would-be suicides, since certain understandable irresolvable problems inhere in life 
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itself The combination of the two points paints an almost impossible picture of dealing 
with suicidal behaviour. The professionals working within the biomedical perspective 
have an interesting way of dealing with this "impossible" situation. An obligation to 
enhance and maintain, what they call the ''life-force" is emphasized by medical 
professionals. This is usually done through preventing suicide at all cost. In view of 
this Maris (1989) rightly states that suicide prevention often tells us more about the 
needs of the helper than about the needs of the suicidal individual. Preventing suicide at 
all cost without understanding the individual meaning around it emphasizes some 
physicians' compulsion .to meddle with other people's lives. "A compulsion to save 
their souls, to tell them how to live (and die), even if it makes them miserable" (Maris, 
1989, pp.435-436). 
The multi-dimensional aspects of suicide are, although recognized by this 
perspective, not directly used in treating an individual exhibiting suicidal behaviour. It 
seems to come in handy, though, when trying to explain failure to enhance ''life-force" 
by means ofbiochemistry. 
2.2.2 The Psychoanalytic Perspective 
Psychoanalytic writers have been concerned with understanding suicide within the 
framework of the individual examining the intrapsychic forces that could give rise to 
suicidal behaviour, the unconscious fantasies expressed by it, and the developmental 
conditions out of which it may spring. Earlier psychoanalytic theory was primarily 
concerned with the role of instinctual forces and the mechanisms by which these 
become subverted into suicidal impulses. More recent psychoanalytic writing has 
concerned itself with the effects of critical childhood experiences on ego structures, the 
development of object relations, and the self (Adam, 1990). Considering the 
importance of the subject and the centrality ofthe issues to psychoanalytic theory, it is 
surprising how little attention psychoanalysts have given to suicide in recent years 
(Adam, 1990; Buie & Maltsberger, 1989; Stillion & McDowell, 1996) 
Freudian theory views suicide as a failure to cope. The failure may arise out of a 
collapse of ego defense mechanisms; or of an overdeveloped, demanding superego; out 
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of prolonged intrapsychic conflict; or out of regression to or fixation at a particular 
psychosexual stage. All of these causes have two things in common: they use up 
energy, and they result in disequilibrium between Thanatos (the death instinct) and Eros 
(the life instinct), a situation in which Thanatos takes command. The direct result might 
be a suicide attempt (Stillion & McDowell, 1996). Hendrick (Stillion & McDowell, 
1996) and Friedlander (Stillion & McDowell, 1996) however, published case reports of 
patients with strong suicidal impulses, which they felt were motivated primarily by 
libidinal (Eros) rather than aggressive (Thanatos) wishes. These authors proposed that 
their patients' actions were associated with pleasurable rather than aggressive fantasies, 
which suggests that the life instinct, as represented by erotic or libidinal aspects of oral 
regressions were as important in some suicidal patients as the aggressive aspects. 
Morse (1973) suggested that the common element in suicidal fantasy is a 
gratification of a wish in relation to a loved object. The main condition leading to 
suicide is a disturbance in reality testing, which allows the individual to believe he or 
she will live after death and experience the "after pleasure" of the suicidal action and its 
effects on others. Menninger (1933, 1938) and Klein (1935) saw the origins of the 
aggression arising from the death instinct and the fear that one's aggression could 
annihilate a good object. While these formulations represent a restatement of Freud's 
original views on suicide in depressed patients, both Menninger and Klein extended 
these by emphasizing the primary role of the death instinct, which had been 
speculatively advanced by Freud. Menninger felt that every suicide entailed three 
distinct elements: the wish to kill, which had its basis in the death instinct; the wish to 
be killed, which arose out of the superego in response to a need for punishment; and the 
wish to die, arising from a more fundamental desire to return to the womb. Melanie 
Klein pointed out that while she agreed with Freud's assertion that suicide represented 
an attack on an internalized object, this attack was directed primarily at the bad part of 
the object and was motivated by a wish to preserve the good internal object, which was 
a valued part of the self 
Several authors, usmg object relations concepts derived from the theories of 
Margaret Mahler, have conceptualized the developmental problem in suicidal patients 
as a failure to negotiate the transition from the symbiotic phase of development, where 
11 
mental representations of the infant self and mother are undifferentiated, to the 
rapprochement subphase of separation individuation, where self and object 
representations are differentiated. The end result of this failure is a tendency to become 
involved in relationships later in life where individuals are treated as parts of the self 
rather than as unique (Adam, 1990). Asch (1980) equates this situation, called 
"symbiotic object choice", with Freud's concept of narcissistic object choice. Asch, 
like Klein (1935), sees the primary goal of suicidal behaviour as getting rid of bad 
internal objects, but differs from her in viewing the principal aim of this as fusion with 
the symbiotic mother ofinfancy. Masterson (1976) used Mahlerian concepts to explain 
suicidal behaviour in borderline patients, while Richman (1979) applied it in 
understanding family dynamics in suicidal patients. 
The essential characteristics of psychoanalytic treatment involves the following: 
two to three face-to-face sessions per week, over many months and even up to 
seven years 
interpretation of the transference, particularly of primitive or part-object 
relations in the transference, mostly in the ''here and now," with "genetic" 
interpretations reserved for advanced stages of the treatment 
interpretation of primitive defensive operations, particularly as they enter the 
transference 
systematic integration of the analysis of current conflicts in external reality and 
of long-range treatment goals with transference interpretation 
repeated reinstatement, via interpretation of a position of technical neutrality 
(Kern berg, 1984 ). 
Kemberg (1984) states that clarification and confrontation are important 
preliminary phases of transference interpretation. It is advantageous that severely self-
. mutilating or suicidal behaviour be controlled by a hospital or day-hospital setting, or 
other social structuring, so that it is only necessary for the therapist to intervene 
psychotherapeutically. The expectation is that suicidal behaviour will gradually be 
transformed into more direct, verbally communicated behaviour patterns in the 
transference, and will be resolved by means of transference interpretation. The theory 
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suggests that only through in-depth analysis can a person obtain the insight necessary to 
understand and cope with unconscious material and with energy-draining intrapsychic 
conflict. 
In a study done by Lester ( 1994) on the utility of theories of suicide on suicidal 
lives, he found that the psychoanalytical theory seemed relatively inappropriate for the 
task. Kernberg (1984) also mentions that one of the most serious criticisms of 
metapsychological theorizing has been that these theoretical explanations are far 
removed from the patient's internal experience. It is quite extraordinary when one 
realizes that an intra-individual theory, like the psychoanalytical one, cannot take 
immediate direct statements regarding patients' inner experiences at face value. Such 
statements are seen to be defensive distortions of deeper motivations that patients 
attempt to hide from themselves and/or from others. 
2.2.3 The Behavioural and Cognitive Perspectives 
The behavioural perspective would maintain that suicidal behaviour, like all 
behaviour, is learned. Whether it is learned by imitation and modeling or through 
unavoidable loss (which can lead to learned helplessness), it can be manipulated. What 
is learned can be unlearned and relearned. It is clear that the role of the therapist in the 
behavioural model is as a teacher, utilizing the powerful principles of learning to help 
clients develop new and healthier ways of coping (Stillion & McDowell, 1996). 
In the past decade, increasing attention has been paid to cognitive factors that may 
contribute to suicidal behaviour. The impetus for examining the role of cognitive 
processing in suicide has come largely from the paradigm shift in behaviour therapy to 
the cognitive domain (Weishaar & Beck, 1990). This has occurred in conjunction with 
research on cognitive aspects of depression and suicide dating from the early 1960s 
(Beck, 1976; Beck, Rush & Shaw, 1979). Cognitive therapy research has also yielded a 
taxonomy of suicidal behaviour; scales for measuring suicidal ideation, suicidal intent, 
and hopelessness; and evidence that hopelessness is an important precursor of suicide 
(Weishaar & Beck, 1990). 
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Efforts have also been made toward developing explanatory models of suicidal 
behaviour. These models incorporate factors that have been found to correlate 
independently with suicidal behaviour. Clum and colleagues (Clum, Patsiokas & 
Luscomb, 1979; Schotte & Clum, 1982) developed a model of suicidal behaviour in 
which poor problem solving is a mediator between life stress and suicide attempts. The 
authors suggested that the combination of life stress and poor problem-solving ability 
led to hopelessness, which in turn discourages the individual from trying to solve 
problems. A later study (Schotte & Clum, 1987) suggested that hopelessness and 
problem-solving deficits are independent factors, both worthy oftreatment . .Qo1lller and 
Rich (1987) developed a model in which alienation, cognitive distortions, and deficient 
adaptive reasons for living predispose an individual to suicidal behaviour while stress 
and increased hopelessness are more immediate precipitants to lethal suicidal behaviour. 
The above research has revealed common cognitive characteristics of suicidal 
individuals, including dichotomous thinking, cognitive rigidity, problem-solving 
deficits, hopelessness, and the acceptance of suicide as a desirable solution. Cognitive 
therapy targets these features to foster more fundamental changes in the patient, thereby 
decreasing the chance of future suicidal behaviour. The elements of cognitive therapy 
with suicidal patients are similar to those of standard cognitive therapy: (1) establishing 
a collaborative relationship between therapist and patient; (2) using questioning as a 
means of assisting the patient to reach his/her own conclusions; and (3) testing the 
validity ofthe patient's assumptions. However, in working with suicidal patients, the 
therapist is much more active and directive. Collaboration does not mean that the 
therapist, at any time, agrees that suicide is an acceptable alternative. Rather, patient 
and therapist work together to generate other perspectives, interpretations, and solutions 
to presenting problems. As in standard cognitive therapy, the ultimate goal is to modify 
the patient's maladaptive assumptions, wirich in this case predispose the patient to self-
destruction. 
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2.3 Conclusion 
The main aim of treatment for these approaches is focused on identifying the 
potentially suicidal individual and preventing the act from occurring through various 
intra-individual means. The Biological perspective, although recognizing various 
contributory factors for suicidal behaviour, focuses on pharmacological intervention as 
the most effective way to prevent the suicidal behaviour from recurring. The 
Psychoanalytic perspective aims at rectifying unconscious drives through insight. Since 
this goal usually takes years, if at all to accomplish, physical restraints in the form of 
hospital stay is necessary. The Behavioural and Cognitive perspectives target the 
patient's cognition with the aim of modifying maladaptive assumptions. The latter is 
replaced by values objectively viewed as more adaptive and which would preclude 
suicidal behaviour as an option when confronted with life stressors. Within the 
Psychiatric paradigm, elaborate, intra-individual theories have been developed with the 
main aim of preventing suicidal behaviour from taking place. Almost ironically none of 
these "intra-individual" theories are concerned with the meanings the individual 
attaches to the chosen (in this case suicidal) behaviour, but more with the "objective" 
perceptions of the therapist. The focus on prevention emphasizes this point even 
further. 
From this chapter it becomes clear that research and theories have greatly, and for 
a long time, focused on the suicidal individual's characteristics and experience. Over 
the years, however, the psychological community recognized the importance of 
understanding suicide within a broader context. Research gradually started to include 
the direct family as well as a focus on societal meanings around suicide. In the next 
chapters an even more inclusive, holistic view will be proposed where the therapist also 
becomes part of the creation of meaning around this topic. This will be done with the 
realisation that the questions we choose to ask, as well as the way in which we choose 
to answer them, greatly influence what we see in the end. 
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CHAPTER3 
THE SOCIOLOGICAL PARADIGM 
3.1 Introduction 
The approach discussed in this section differs from the psychiatric paradigm in its 
basic assumption that 'the source of suicidal behaviour is to be found in the relationships 
between the individual 'and his/her social environment. It differs from the systemic 
paradigm in that it arises from a mechanistic worldview, which seeks to explain human 
behaviour by identifying linear-causal relationships between objectively observable 
elements (Erasmus, 1988). This dualistic punctuation of reality is considered 
characteristic of a Western/Newtonian view of science in general (Auerswald, 1987) 
and research and theory arising from it is often characterized by a commitment to 
empiricism. 
A three-fold classification of theories according to the level of explanation will be 
adopted here, following the classification used most often in the sociological literature. 
Microlevel theories or explanations focus mainly on relationships between individuals 
within the family system Social-psychological explanations (exolevel explanations) 
focus on the interaction of the individual with the social environment, that is, with other 
individuals, groups and organizations. Sociocultural or macrolevel explanations 
examine social structures or arrangements such as norms, values, institutional 
organization, or systems operations to explain individual behaviour. These categories 
of theories are obviously not mutually exclusive and boundaries between them are not 
always clear (Erasmus, 1988). 
3.2 Microlevel Explanations 
Family systems theory exammes how family members influence and are 
influenced by one another. Family therapists focus on the family system as the root of 
problematic behaviour of any individual member and advocate work with the family 
system to solve the problem (Osgood, 1989). The family therapy movement originated 
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during the nineteen-forties and evolved out of a continuing search for a useful paradigm 
to understand human systems and to work with human problems. The search 
progressed beyond the traditional boundaries of psychotherapy into other scientific 
areas such as general systems theory, cybernetics, quantum theory, and biological 
theories (Anderson, Goolishian & Windermand, 1986). Various people unrelated to 
psychology or sociology influenced this search as can be seen in Chapter 4 where the 
ecosystemic paradigm is discussed in more depth. 
Auerswald (1987) ,describes these developments in terms of five paradigms as it 
emerged in the field of family therapy research and treatment. The first is the 
psychodynamic paradigm, which is seldom used today. ''The family is defined as a 
group made up of the interlocking psychodynamics of its members who are at various 
developmental stages" (Auerswald, 1987, p.321). Secondly, there is the family systems 
paradigm, ''which defines a family as a system that operates independently, and from 
which individual psychodynamics, including those that create symptoms, emerge" 
(Auerswald, 1987, p.321). The third is a general systems paradigm in ''which a family 
is defined as a system that shares isomorphic characteristics with all systems, and which 
arranges systems in a hierarchy" (Auerswald, 1987, p.321). The fourth is a cybernetic 
systems paradigm, ''which defines a system, including a family system, in terms of 
circular information flow and regulatory mechanisms" (Auerswald, 1987, p.321); the 
fifth is an ecological (or ecosystemic) paradigm, ''which defines a family as a 
coevolutionary ecosystem located in evolutionary timespace" (Auerswald, 1987, 
pp.321-322). He states that ']laradigms 2 through 4 have been merging into what is 
being called family systems therapy" (Auerswald, 1987, p.322), while paradigm 5 is 
seen as having a different epistemological base. 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation corresponds to Paradigm 1 of Auerswald's (1987) 
classification, and the current chapter corresponds in varying degrees to his Paradigms 2 
to 4. Chapter 4 will be an introduction to his Paradigm 5. The whole of this 
dissertation aims to be an exercise in viewing the family as "an ecosystem located in 
evolutionary timespace" (Auerswald, 1987, p.322) and would therefore compare with 
his Paradigm 5. 
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In a comparison study to determine the major precipitants and conflict areas in an 
attempted suicide group Richman (1979) found family conflicts and arguments as the 
most significant area. Most suicide researchers agree that when focusing on the 
childhood of a suicidal adult it would probably be marked by an unusual amount of 
economic deprivation, neglect and disharmony between his/her parents. Many suicidal 
adults grew up in families in which parents had psychiatric problems and were suicidal 
themselves (Orbach, Gross & Glaubman, 1981), where there was conflict among 
members (Wright, 1985), parental rejection (Hussain & Vandiver, 1984), little 
expressiveness (Lester 1997a) and sexual and other abusive patterns (Pfeffer, 1986). 
Jacobs (1971) also documented that family trauma and disruptions were more extensive 
for suicidal adolescents than for nonsuicidal adolescents. 
Richman (1979) proposes characteristics of the families that can produce a suicidal 
individual and which could help with the identification and assessment of suicidal 
behaviour. He stresses, however, that no evaluation of suicide potential is complete 
without taking into account individual factors, the family and social milieu as well as 
the current situation or crisis. The main characteristics of such families are shown in 
Table 3.1 and was developed mainly to serve as an easy way to identify "suicidal" 
families. Richman's (1979) model can be seen as an example that belongs to 
Auerswald's (1987) psychodynamic as well as family systems Paradigms. There is a 
focus on the individual's psychodynamics as well as an emphasis on the family as a 
closed system 
Table 3.1 
The Family Assessment of Suicidal Potential (Richman, 1979, p.l32) 
I. An inability to accept necessary change. 
(a) An intolerance for separation. 
(b) A symbiosis without empathy 
(c) A fixation upon infantile patterns and the primary relationships 
II. Role conflicts, failures, and fixations. 
III. A disturbed family structure. 
(a) A closed family system 
(b) A prohibition against intimacy outside the family 
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(c) An isolation of the potentially suicidal person within the family 
(d) A quality of family fragility 
IV. Affective difficulties. 
(a) A one-sided pattern of aggression. 
(b) A family depression 
V. Unbalanced or one-sided intrafamilial relationships. 
(a) A specific kind ofscapegoating. 
(b) Double-binding, sado-masochistic relationships. 
(c) The potentially suicidal individual becomes the bad object for the entire 
family. 
VI. Transactional difficulties. 
(a) Communication disturbances. 
(b) An excessive secretiveness. 
vn. An intolerance for crises. 
In his critical evaluation of the strength of the emerging body of empirical research 
regarding family risk factors for suicidal behaviour in adolescents, Wagner (1997) 
mentions five different, though somewhat overlapping, conceptual foundations. They 
include (a) poor family communication and problem solving, (b) scapegoating of the 
suicidal child, (c) disturbance in parent-child attachment, (d) marital dysfunction, and 
(e) parental psychopathology. Wagner presents a more applicable model that moves 
away from a purely psychodynamic focus on individual family members and would 
thus correspond with Auerswald's (1987) Paradigms 2 to 4. Since his classification 
represents a more inclusive model of the current family characteristics associated with 
suicidal behaviour Wagner's ( 1997) model will be discussed in broader detail. This 
discussion will also point out the obvious focus on not only family characteristics but 
also a shift to a description of the relationships and communication between members. 
Stressing a distinctive move to another paradigm. 
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3.2.1 Poor Family Communication and Problem Solving 
Richman (1986) states that the suicidal act is a desperate communication that only 
makes sense in the light of the ineffectiveness of any alternative effort to communicate 
with family members. He goes on to say that families of suicidal people avoid direct 
verbal communication, but that they instead rely on indirect, nonverbal gestures. They 
also tend to walk out on arguments, ignore one another, and remain impervious to 
suicidal intentions expressed by one another. Bonnar and McGee (1977) found that the 
quality of interpersonal. communication between spouses significantly deteriorated as 
the degree of suicidal behaviour increased. Other researchers (Orbach, 1986; Peck, 
1984; Pfeffer, 1981, 1986; Richman, 1986) point out that family members are strongly 
discouraged from openly expressing their emotions, despite the fact that they often have 
strong feelings of hostility toward one another. Because of this high degree of 
secretiveness, the suicidal person may perceive that he or she is left completely alone to 
carry the emotional burden of unsolvable problems for the entire family. Pfeffer (1981) 
emphasizes that it is these communication deficits that prevent the family from flexibly 
coping with change of any sort. Problems therefore linger, resulting in chronically high 
levels of stress and frequent crisis. 
3.2.2 Scapegoating ofthe Suicidal Child 
Pfeffer (1986) suggested that suicidal behaviour emerges as the person's 
mechanism of last resort to escape from his/her own negative perceptions. These 
perceptions are introjections of those of a hostile parent that are then felt as self-hatred. 
Scapegoating occurs when parents direct hostile or critical emotions specifically toward 
the suicidal child, as a way of alleviating the tension in another family subsystem. 
Sabbath (1969) believed that some parents perceive a child as a threat to his/her well 
being, to such an extent that the parent wishes to be rid of the child or for the child to 
die. The "expendable child" perceives this message even though the parent may not 
verbalise it. Richman (1986) also observed that in suicidal families it is often as if one 
of its members must fail to ensure the success of the other( s ). Other suicide theorists 
have described how parents send strong messages of rejection to children who become 
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suicidal, so the children come to feel burdensome and that they have no right to live 
(Hendin, 1975; Orbach, 1986; Schmt, 1964). 
ln the case of physical abuse, the child is not only left with the message of severe 
rejection, but also that the caretaker is unpredictable (Carlson, Cicchetti & Braunwald, 
1989). Some physically abused children may come to believe that they deserve severe 
punishment, so they may punish themselves with self-destructive acts (Pfeffer, 1986). 
3.2.3 Attachment Theory 
The studies of relevance to attachment are grouped into several categories. After 
Bowlby's ( 1980) theory (discussed later in this paragraph) researchers have investigated 
the impact of loss or unavailability of an attachment figure due to several causes, 
including death, separation or divorce, child living apart from one or both parents, or 
medical illness of a parent. According to the following theories, suicidal behaviour is 
seen as ineffective and self-destructive attempts to seek revenge or to achieve closeness 
and caregiving. Bowlby argued that the motives for a completed suicide typically 
revolve around a deceased attachment figure. Revenge, a wish to reunite, a wish to 
destroy oneself for contributing to the death, and/or a feeling that one cannot go on 
without the deceased person can all be motives for completed suicide. ln contrast, a 
wish to signal distress and elicit a caregiving response from a living attachment figure, 
or a wish to punish, so as to coerce a neglectful caregiver into being more attentive, are 
named as motives for attempted suicide (Molin, 1986). 
Other researchers have similarly argued that suicide attempts represent the youths' 
efforts to have their parents feel the same sense of frustration or injury that they believe 
the parents have caused them to feel (Adam, Sheldon-Keller & West, 1996; Hendin, 
1975; Schrut, 1964; Shaw & Schelkun, 1965; Toolan, 1962). Unfortunately, it rarely 
results in more consistent parental caretaking over the longer term 
Several theorists (Pfeffer, 1986; Richman, 1986; Sabbath, 1969) feel that parents 
of a suicidal child could identify the child with an attachment figure in the parents' prior 
generation, especially if the parent felt mistreated by this person. It often happens that 
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parents would tum to their children to fulfill their needs in this regard. A suicide 
attempt may represent an effort to coerce the parent into the caretaker role. 
3.2.4 Marital Dysfunction 
Ffeffer (1986) describes a high degree of inflexibility in the spousal relationship of 
parents of suicidal children, marked by ambivalence and threats of separation. She also 
described a pattern in which conflict betWeen spouses is displaced onto the suicidal 
child. Marital discord might be associated with youths' suicidal behaviour because of 
two reasons. Overhearing parental arguments or parents threatening to separate can be 
highly stressful. Parents in unhappy relationships might also be less emotionally 
available to their child (Coyne, Downey & Boergers, 1992; Downey & Coyne, 1990) 
3.2.5 Parental Psychopathology 
Clinicians have long observed psychopathology in the parents of suicidal youths. 
Four areas which show supposed links with suicidal behaviour include suicidal 
symptoms, affective disorder, substance abuse, and antisocial behaviour (Wagner, 
1997). No researcher or theorist has yet specified a coherent model of the mechanisms 
by which parental psychopathology may play a role in the development of suicidal 
behaviour in their offspring (Wagner, 1997). Shaffer, Garland, Gould, Fisher and 
Trautman (1988) state that children may inherit a predisposition to psychopathology, 
which in turn puts them at higher risk of suicidal behaviour. Bandura (1969) theorised 
that children exposed to parents who model disturbed behaviour may learn to use the 
sorts of coping mechanisms that are characteristic of suicidal individuals. Field ( 1984) 
feels that parents with psychopathology tend to be harsh, inconsistent, or neglectful, 
which in tum places the child at risk for depression, including suicidal symptoms. 
Wagner (1997) states that there is very little firm evidence that supports the 
finding that several aspects of poor family functioning are risk factors for suicidal 
behaviour. He mentions that a reason for this can be the research designs used. The 
only conclusion that he thus makes is that family variables are correlates of suicidal 
symptoms. Richman (1979) says that it may not be possible to eliminate many of the 
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destructive and exploitative patterns through family therapy. He continues to say that 
the sheer fact of entering family therapy can, however, help to open up a closed system 
in many suicidogenic families. Hawton (1986, p.113) also believes that the broadening 
of the perspective in which suicidal behaviour is viewed within the family system. 
makes family therapy ''the treatment approach of choice", while Richman (1979) states 
that family therapy represents the optimal treatment of serious suicidal behaviour. 
When suicide is viewed as a psychosocial event and especially when it is understood to 
be a need of the family to maintain a specific pattern of relationships, the entire family 
must be regarded as the client in therapy. A multitude of different schools resides 
within the family therapy movement, each with its own emphasis on approach and 
intervention strategies. Only a few of them has specifically written about the 
therapeutic treatment of suicidal behaviour though. Broad ideas of what family therapy 
with suicidal individuals entail will be mentioned briefly. 
Trautman, Stewart and Morishima (1993) focuses on the fact that people, 
especially adolescents exhibiting suicidal behaviour, are likely to keep fewer 
appointments and remain in treatment more briefly, to suggest short-term family 
therapy. Kerfoot, Harrington and Dyer (1995) developed a short term, focused, 
intensive and home-based intervention programme for family therapy that proved to be 
successful. Although it is recognized that a comprehensive understanding of suicidal 
behaviour requires a knowledge of social, psychological and biological factors, 
assessment and treatment takes place within the family context. The family 1s 
encouraged to develop skills, to recognize stress and to deal with it within the family. 
With the recognition of the broader system and relationships around the suicidal 
individual it was thus recognized that the whole family should be the unit of treatment 
of suicidal behaviour. This approach is, however still rooted in a paradigm that stresses 
the objective identification and assessment of these factors as well as an attempt to 
remove or replace such characteristics with "better" ones. 
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3.3 Social-Psychological (Exolevel) Explanations 
People are members of systems other than the family, such as school, work, peer 
group and community. Communicative acts, such as suicidal behaviour, are not 
restricted to the family per se. Shulman and Margalit (1985) emphasize the systemic 
point of view, that suicidal acts outside the family can be perceived in the context of the 
system where the acts take place. As in the family, the system dynamics and structure 
of the broader system may enhance suicidal tendencies in the child or adolescent to such 
an extent that suicidal acts be a means of controlling the system processes. Little 
literature is available where suicidal behaviour is explained on the basis of interaction of 
individuals with his/her immediate social environment, excluding the family. This 
might be attributed to the fact that there are a large number of variations in any person's 
mesosystems (Henry, Stephenson, Hanson & Hargett, 1994). However, Thurman, 
Martin and Martin (1985) have focused on stress resulting from the transitions between 
various microsystems ofNative American adolescents to explain the high suicide rate 
among them. Their explanation is that this stress results from the transitions between 
life on reservations, in boarding schools, and on the outside, and from the divergent 
expectations in these different environments. 
3.4 Sociocultural (Macrolevel) Explanations 
Theories at this level of explanation emphasize variables such as social structures, 
functions, subcultures or social systems to explain suicide. They also include concepts 
and relationships existing at the microlevel and social psychological level though 
(Gelles & Straus, 1979). Different norms and values of social groups and cultures have 
been associated with variations in the prevalence of suicide (Bankston, Allen & 
Cunningham, 1983; Headley, 1984) and have also been touched upon briefly in Chapter 
5. Farber (1986) suggested that the attitude of a given society or dominant group may 
make a difference in the suicide rate. Differences in learned attitude may account, 
therefore, for the low suicide rate among Roman Catholics as compared to Protestants, 
and for the variations that we see in the suicide rate among the Scandinavian countries. 
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Osgood (1989) gives another example of how an attitude of a given society may 
influence suicide rates, when she reviewed cultural explanations for the high suicide 
rate among the elderly. The cultural explanation posits a strong relationship between 
level of modernization (based on level of technology, degree of urbanization, rate of 
social change, and degree ofwesternization) and status ofthe elderly. She goes on to 
say that in western technologically advanced societies, the elderly are devalued and hold 
less power, status, and economic control than in less advanced societies. In such a 
culture the old lose status and their self-concept suffers. Suicide may therefore 
represent a personal expression of their reaction to negative cultural images. 
Emile Durkheim, a major figure in sociology, developed the most comprehensive 
theory in an attempt to explain suicidal behaviour. He hypothesized that suicides occur 
as a result of the kind of ''fit" an individual experiences in his/her society (Lester, 
1997a). His landmark work Le Suicide, which was first published in 1897, was based 
on a comparison of the suicide rates of a number of European countries with that of the 
United States. A number of social variables were isolated in an attempt to arrive at 
some generalizations about society as a whole. It is therefore as much a study of 
sociological method as it is a study of suicide (Adam, 1990). Observing that suicide 
appeared to vary inversely with the degree of integration of the individual into religious, 
domestic, and political society, he arrived at the following basic hypothesis: "Suicide 
varies inversely with the degree of integration of the social groups of which the 
individual forms a part" (Durkheim, 1952, p.209). 
He described four types of suicide categorized according to the degree to which 
the individual was integrated with and regulated by society. ''Egoistic suicide" 
occurred when excessive individuation or insufficient integration into society led to life 
weariness and depression. "Altruistic suicide", by contrast, occurred when there was 
insufficient individuation and excessive integration into society and led the individual to 
see his/her social group as more important than the self "Anomie suicide" occurs 
where the individuals feel they have been abandoned by a society that no longer 
provides them with the regulation that they need. Such suicides were felt to occur 
during periods of abrupt social change, like depression, unemployment and divorce. 
"Fatalistic suicide" occurs when the individual's life is subject to excessive social 
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regulation beyond his/her choice or control so that the individual despairs of any life of 
his/her own (Adam, 1990). 
The intetpretation most accepted by American sociologists of Durkheim' s theory 
suggests social behaviour as the cause of social meanings and hence suicide. The 
structure of society therefore shapes the patterns of social interaction, which in turn 
determine the degree of social integration, which would determine the type and 
frequency of suicidal behaviour (Lester, 1997a). Douglas (1967), however, took a 
different view. He suggested that social meanings cause social behaviour and hence 
suicide. 
Lester (1997a) pointed out that Durkheim intetpreted information in ways that 
would support his theory. He continues to say that his statistical analyses were naive by 
modem standards, and that he failed to give clear definitions of his concepts or to 
provide guidelines for operationalizing the theoretical elements. He also assumed that 
social meanings are always immediately obvious to the sociologist, and that there was 
no need to provide empirical support for the conclusions reached by them. Phillips, 
Ruth and MacNamara (1994) state that the theory was so flexible that it was irrefutable. 
Durkheim' s approach can be criticized in many ways, although the faults can be 
attributed more to his era than to his ideas (Lester, 1997 a). 
Several theorists have tried to reformulate Durkheim's ideas and make his theory a 
testable one (Lester, 1997a). They confirmed many of his general findings and have 
attempted to take more account of the way in which social variables impact on the 
individual. Only a few of the more significant ones will be discussed here. Henry and 
Short (1954) found that suicide increased more during periods of economic depression 
than it decreased in periods of prosperity and that these relationships impacted more 
strongly on men than on women. According to them, the external restraints imposed by 
society that produce frustration and aggression interact with the internal restraints 
(psychological) of the individual. They therefore used Dollard's frustration-aggression 
hypothesis to build their theory (Lester, 1997a). The balance of these forces of internal 
and external restraint determines whether aggression will be expressed outwardly in 
homicide, or inwardly in suicide. Gibbs and Martin (1964) extended Durkheim's 
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hypotheses to examine role functioning in society, concluding that it was the degree of 
the individual's "status integration" that governed vulnerability to suicide. The more 
integrated individuals in a society are into their occupational roles, the higher their 
status integration and the lower their suicide risk (Adam, 1990). 
Other sociological studies examined the dynamics of social change in relation to 
suicide (Adam, 1990). Breed (1963) and Maris (1975) found that suicide is more 
directly related to loss of social status and do\\nward mobility than to social status in 
itself In an attempt to overcome some of the difficulties involved in the more 
traditional sociological studies based exclusively on suicide rates in large populations, 
researchers have designed more detailed ecological studies of the social environment of 
suicidal individuals. The one difficulty that Maris (1969) cautioned against with 
regards to suicide research involves taking the characteristics of a society to explain the 
characteristics of individuals or of subsets of individuals within these groups. It is 
beyond the scope of this work to investigate the more specific ecological studies done 
on suicide. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The basic argument within the sociological paradigm as it is applied to suicidal 
behaviour, is that a variety of factors at interpersonal level, intra-family level, or socio-
cultural level give rise to suicidal behaviour. A broader understanding of suicidal 
behaviour is therefore offered. A microlevel explanation of suicidal behaviour 
emphasizes the influence family members have on one another and subsequently 
suicidal behaviour. Exolevel explanations focus on the fact that individuals are part of 
significant systems other than the family where suicidal behaviour might fit their role. 
Macrolevel explanations look at broader systems and their impact on individual 
behaviour. Suicidal behaviour is seen as either cause or effect of social structure and/or 
social meaning. Not only does it call for a broader perspective than that found in most 
psychological approaches, but it also opened up the debate . around the structure vs. 
meaning of social systems. Suicidal behaviour becomes more meaningful when 
examined against the social fabric of society (Stillion & McDowell, 1996). 
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Sociological theories as a whole have, however, been left open to a number of 
criticisms. These criticisms can broadly be grouped into firstly criticism against 
methodology and secondly criticism against the concept of social structure used in 
sociology. It seems that a great deal of time has been spent trying to clarify Durkheim's 
theory, while the investment of energy could have been better employed in the 
development of new concepts. In addition to a tendency to make the interpretation of 
data fit preexisting assumptions, there have been biases of subject matter (e.g., studying 
only completed suicide) that may have hampered the formation of sound theories. 
Sociologists have too readily accepted categories of subgroups provided by government 
agencies (such as whites and nonwhites), that do not make sense from a theoretical 
point of view. They have also often used official suicide statistics that may not be 
sufficiently reliable (Lester, 1997a). The gap between Protestant and Catholic suicide 
rates in the Netherlands (1905-1910) appears to be the result of nothing more 
mysterious than differences in how deaths of Catholics and deaths of Protestants were 
recorded. 
A few researchers also share criticism targeted at the concept of social structure. 
Bogdan (1984) states that family structure is "simply the name of a class of patterns of 
communicative behaviour between people" (p.383). Family structure can thus not 
explain a pattern of communicative behaviour between people, ''because it is the 
pattern" (Bogdan, 1984, p.383). He goes on to say that when the behaviour of family 
members is characterized as a response to certain abnormal family structures, or to a 
particular organizational context, it implies the existence of entities - structures, 
contexts, rules - which is distinguishable from patterns of communicative behaviour 
between individuals. The result is that the image of the group as "extraordinarily 
mental creatures" is obscured (Bogdan, 1984, p.376). Anderson et al. (1986) agree with 
this observation in their statement that the assumptions of family therapy theory are 
predicated on concepts of role and structure. They go on to say that the advantages of 
the field have turned to disadvantages, blinding us in our search for answers. 
Social theories have so influenced our commonly shared beliefs about social role, 
socialization and the functioning of social systems, that we in the mental health 
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field rarely question their logical consistency, their influence, nor their 
implications for theory and practice. (Anderson et al., 1986, p.2) 
They therefore challenge the traditional views of social structure as a foundation 
underlying current psychotherapy practice and theory and present the concept of 
meaning and language systems, problem-determined systems, as an alternative 
(Anderson et al., 1986). 
A reductionistic error is, however, still committed when suicidal behaviour is viewed 
from this perspective. Suicidal behaviour is seen as lineally caused by objectively 
observable relationships residing in various social structures. Family and other systems are 
being viewed as black boxes with clearly demarcated input and output relationships. 
Therapy is seen as an attempt at "opening up" or making overt problematic systems that 
will then discard suicidal behaviour in favor of other more acceptable forms of 
communication. The complex system ofhuman relationships is being investigated without 
seeing the therapist as part of the therapeutic system Luhmann (in Anderson et al., 1986, 
p.3) believes that the therapist can only be seen as collaborator in therapy when social 
action and systems changes to "collaborative action and discourse". How therapist became 
collaborator will be examined more fully in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER4 
THE ECOSYSTEMIC PARADIGM 
4.1 Introduction 
A lens, or frame of reference, detennines the pattern we see, whether it is up or 
down, distorted or not. A change of lens always invokes a perial of initial 
confusion or transition. If an observer can endure the crisis of trallSition, a new 
frame will result in an alternative order. The task of epistemological change; 
although dramatically more difficult, is comparable. Through the lens of 
cybernetic epistemology, an alternative world will eventually emerge. (Keeney, 
1983a, p.155) 
In this chapter it is aimed to give an overview ofthe Ecosystemic perspective. To 
understand this perspective would entail a change of lens. A process, which as Keeney 
(1983a) points out in the above quotation, is a confusing one. It is not merely a 
rearrangement of concepts, but it involves the breakdown of our everyday conception of 
reality (Von Glasersfeld, 1984), something, with which Maturana's theory and concepts 
can greatly assist us. A second-order, constructivist approach, in the form ofMaturana's 
theory was therefore chosen to illuminate the focus the writer wishes to c.onvey regarding 
the ecosystemic paradigm as it applies to suicidal behaviour. 
A reconceptualization of suicidal behaviour will be given which will provide an 
alternative view of it, a view where the therapist's perspective and way of knowing 
becomes part of an investigation and understanding of suicidal behaviour. The 
implications of an ecosystemic perspective on the therapy of suicidal behaviour will also 
be discussed in some depth. Through this process it will become clear why it was 
necessary for the family therapy movement not to ignore epistemological transitions that 
took place in other sciences, but to apply it to the social systems they work with. 
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4.2 The shift to an Ecosystemic Epistemology 
The major assumptions of a Cartesian-Newtonian epistemology were discussed in 
Chapter 2 and would thus not be repeated here. It is, however, important to mention that 
this paradigm consists of a number of entrenched ideas and values, among them, the view 
of the "universe as a mechanistic system composed of elementary building blocks, the 
view of the human body as a machine as well as the view of social life as a constant 
st~ggle for existence" (Capra, 1996, p.6). Although the change from a mechanistic to an 
ecosystemic epistemology has proceeded in different forms and at different speeds in 
various scientific fields, it has, in a "seemingly random" way resulted in ''forming a 
complex, highly organized pattern" (Capra, 1996, p.17). 
4.3 Characteristics of Ecosystemic Thinking 
The most general characteristic of ecosystemic thinking is the shift from parts to 
whole. Living systems are seen as integrated wholes whose properties cannot be reduced 
to those of smaller parts. Their essential properties "arise from the organizing relations of 
the parts" (Capra, 1996, p.37). The shift from the parts to the whole can also be seen as a 
shift from a focus on objects to a focus on relationships, and from the metaphor of 
knowledge to that of the "network". For most scientists such a view of knowledge as a 
network with no firm foundations is extremely unsettling, and it is therefore not generally 
accepted. The implications of such a view make this unsettlement clear. The first 
implication is that physics are not the most fundamental level of science. When the 
material universe is seen as a dynamic web of interrelated events, the properties of any part 
of the web follows from the properties of the other parts, and the overall pattern (not 
fundamental physics) determines the structure ofthe web. The second implication is that 
scientific descriptions are not objective, it can never be independent of the human observer 
or the process of knowing in a context of interrelation. An understanding of the process of 
knowing has to be included explicitly in any description of natural phenomena. 
Ecosystemic thinking therefore involves "a shift from objective to epistemic science, to a 
framework in which epistemology - the method of questioning - becomes an integral part 
of scientific theories" (Capra, 1996, p. 40). 
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Another key characteristic of ecosystemic thinking involves the shifting of focus 
between system levels. Different systems nest within other systems. The same concepts 
can thus be applied to different system levels to gain insight, if it is remembered that these 
different system levels represent levels of differing complexity (Capra, 1996). 
An important question that anses with this approach to sctence involves our 
understanding of the world we live in. How can we ever hope to understand anything, if 
everything is connected to everything else? Capra (1996) states that the discovery of 
"approximate knowledge" makes it possible. Science can therefore never provide 
complete and definitive understanding, but can only provide limited and approximate 
knowledge. ''No matter how many connections we take into account in our scientific 
descriptions of a phenomenon, we will always be forced to leave others out" (Capra, 1996, 
p.42). We are forced to realize that we are never dealing \vith the ''truth", but with limited 
and approximate descriptions of reality. According to Louis Pasteur (in Capra, 1982, 
p.lOl) "Science advances through tentative answers to a series of more and more subtle 
questions which reach deeper and deeper into the essence of natural phenomena". 
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Ecosystemic epistemology, )ike other nonlineal approaches, therefore challenges 
Ne~oman epistemology (Keeney, 1982) and is founded on the princ~pl~~ of ecology, 
syste~"t!t,~Qry and cybernetics (Keeney, 1983a). It represents a shift in focus from 
isolated individual units to a more in-depth focus on the whole ecosystem;.it even shifts to 
the system's way ofknowing, that is, "a way of thinking about one's thinking" or thinking 
about "one's way of knowing" (Keeney & Sprenkle, 1982, p.6). It attempts to see the 
interrelationships of whole systems rather than dividing the world up into segments. There 
is thus an emphasis on interrelation, context, ecology, relationship and a sensitivity to 
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hot!~~"~~~ ~omplexity (Keeney, 1982). Certain cybernetic and second-order cybernetic 
concepts will make the basic characteristics of ecosystemic thinking clear and will now be 
elaborated on. 
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4.4 Cybernetics 
Cyberneticians began in the early 1940's to study inanimate machines to ultimately 
compare it with living organisms in an effort to lUlderstand and control complex systems. 
Their main focus was not only on feedback mechanisms, but on how this forms the basis 
of information processing and patterns of communication. Wiener (in Capra, 1996) named 
this unified approach to problems of communication and control, "cybernetics" and 
defined it as the science of "control and communication in the animal and the machine" 
(Capra, 1996, p.51). Va,rious researchers who were drawn from several disciplines, for 
example, mathematics, neurology, sociology and engineering, were led in their search to 
the concepts of feedback and self-regulation and then later to self-organization (Capra, 
1996). 
4.4.1 Feedback 
The skill of steering a boat or riding a bicycle is reliant on the concept of feedback. 
When a boat, for example, deviates from a preset course, the helmsman assesses the 
deviation and counter-steers to correct it. Continual feedback is therefore necessary to 
keep the boat on course. A feedback loop as the most fundamental (sic) part of this 
process is described by Capra (1996, p.56) as "a circular arrangement of causally 
connected elements, in which an initial cause propagates around the links of the loop, so 
that each element has an effect on the next, until the last feeds back the effect into the first 
element of the cycle". When "input" is therefore affected by "output" of the same system 
it results in the self-regulation of a particular system. Information about past behaviour is 
fed back into the system in a circular manner. On the level of simple (first-order) 
cybernetics two kinds of feedback can be distinguished. 
Positive feedback acknowledges that a change has occurred in a system 
Information about a deviation from a preciously established norm is fed back into the 
system and is responded to in such a manner that the difference is accepted (Becvar & 
Becvar, 1996). Negative feedback indicates that the status quo is being maintained in a 
system Fluctuations or disturbances are being opposed and a particular level of stability is 
being maintained. 
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4.4.2 Self-regulation and Homeostasis 
Ahhough self-regulating machines existed long before the formal conceptualization 
of cybernetics, the pattern of circular causality was never recognized. The centrifugal 
governor of a steam engine invented by James Watt in the eighteenth century is a classic 
example of this (Capra, 1996). When a machine is therefore controlled by its actual 
performance being fed back to it, it can be understood as a self-regulating system. 
Wiener and his colleagues (Capra, 1996) also recognized feedback as the essential 
mechanism ofhomeostasis, the self-regulation ofliving organisms and social systems that 
allows them to maintain themselves in a state of dynamic balance. 
4.4 .3 Self-organization 
Self-organization refers to the spontaneous emergence of new structures and new 
forms of behaviour in open systems characterized by internal feedback loops. Various 
researchers studied self-organization in many different systems, for example, llya 
Prigogine in Belgium on physical and chemical systems, Manfred Eigen in Germany on 
catalytic cycles and Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela in Chile on organismic, 
biological systems (Capra, 1996), not knowing at the time that a whole new view of the 
organization of living systems will eventually emerge. At this stage it seems appropriate to 
introduce the concept of second-order cybernetics (cybernetics of cybernetics) and to 
discuss Maturana and Varela's theory in more depth. 
4.5 Cybernetics of Cybernetics 
'The contn"bution of Maturana and Varela is that they proposed a description of 
whole systems from the perspective of a whole system itseU: without any reference to its 
outside environment" (Keeney, 1982, p.159). Since the organization of living systems or 
the nervous system is informationally closed (Maturana, 1975). In- and outside of the 
organizationally closed nervous system, therefore, only exists for the observer who 
beholds it, and not for the system (Johnson, 1993). 
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According to second-order cybernetic thlnking, reality can never be examined from 
an outsideperspective if it is constructed. Or as Maturana (1975) puts it, it is not possible 
to-be in both the domain of experience and the domain of description at the same time. 
The subject matter of second-order cybernetics (or cybernetics of cybernetics), therefore, 
becomes (true to the constructivist concept of self-reference) "about you, about me, about 
you/me, about subject matters, about thinking, about how we know what we know 
(epistemology), and about what constitutes knowledge" (Becvar & Becvar, 1996, p.345). 
Second-order concepts will now be discussed to illuminate this introduction and 
Maturana's theory. 
4.5.1 Autonomy and Self-reference 
Autonomy refers to the highest order of recursion or feedback processes of a system, 
the end result of which will be the organization of the whole system To speak of the 
distinctive wholeness of a system is therefore a way of speaking of that system's 
autonomy. A system's autonomy requires no reference to its outside environment, but 
instead must be described through reference to itself Self-referentiality of a system 
therefore becomes a way of emphasizing a system's autonomy (Varela, 1976). No part of 
what we do to an autonomous system ever gets inside the system but rather interacts with 
the wholeness of the system. Maturana and Varela call these interactions "perturbations" 
rather than inputs (Keeney, 1982). This leads us to the idea of systems as structure-
determined entities. 
4.5.2 Structure Determinism 
Maturana's ontological claim is that the world is structure-determined. In short 
what he means by this, is that the behaviour of all, in this case living systems, are fully 
determined by their structures (i.e., by the components of the unity and by the relations 
among those components). This is the case, because the system has to maintain its circular 
organization in order to remain a living system (Maturana & Varela, 1980). The structure 
of an object determines its behaviour by specifying all of the interactions it can undergo, 
that is, which events in its environment it can interact with, and how it will behave under 
each and every one ofthese interactions (Dell, 1985). This structure also changes with 
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every encounter and interaction. Interactions can, however, never be "instructive", but can 
only consist of a fit, match or structural coupling (Dell, 1985). 
4.5.3 Structural Coupling and Non-purposeful Drift 
Structural coupling refers to the sufficiency of fit between systems. If the fit 
between two systems is insufficient it can ultimately cease to exist. If two systems are able 
to mutually coexist they will continuously change structurally in their co-drifting as long as 
organization and correspondence with a medium is conserved (Maturana, 1975). This 
process is ''historical", because each structural change is a modification of a previously 
existing structure and forms the basis for the following one. Maturana uses the term 
ontogeny to refer to this history, where the course of structural changes is contingent upon 
the interactions it undergoes in its medium 
4.5.4 Consensual Domains and Language 
In the interaction of two individual organisms the co-ordination of their actions is 
referred to as their co-ontogeny. If the structural changes that each organism undergoes 
correspond, the result of the ontogenic structural coupling is a consensual domain. A 
domain ofbehaviour is therefore created in which the "structurally determined changes of 
state of the coupled organisms correspond to each other in interlocked sequences" 
(Maturana, 1975, p.326). This is the case because of the consequences of their respective 
actions for each other in the medium Their behaviours become consensual because of the 
moment to moment co-ontogenic structural interactions of their systems in its medium 
(which is also comprised of the other). This consensual co-ordination ofbehaviour refers, 
according to Maturana (1978), to linguistic behaviour. 
Language is linguistic behaviour about linguistic behaviour, or as Maturana chooses 
to conceptualize it: ''the recursive mutual co-ordination of actions (distinctions) of 
consensual co-ordinations of actions (distinctions)" (Maturana, 1988, p.48). The 
phenomenon of language also introduces the observer. By being in language we make 
distinctions or descriptions of descriptions and become observers and self-observers. 
''Everything said is said by an observer to another observer" (p.315). In language we can 
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therefore reflexively describe ourselves and describe ourselves describing ourselves and so 
on. Maturana and Varela (1987) call this "self-consciousness" (p.375). 
4.5.5 Objectivity-in-parentheses 
Maturana and Varela (1987) believe that prior to language no object exists. Objects 
become specified through the co-ordinations of co-ordinations of consensual actions, that 
is, through language. As soon as the operations of distinction which an object stands for 
are obscured, it becomes an object. Because of this reification, objects seem to exist 
independent of everything. Maturana (1978), therefore, puts objectivity in parentheses 
mainly because of the failure of the science of neurophysiology to find a way to explain 
our perception of objects external to us. Objectivity in parentheses entails that "existence 
is constitutively dependent on the observer and that there are as many domains of truth as 
domains of existence (a person chooses to) bring forth in his/her distinctions" (Maturana, 
1978, p.332). Focus should thus not be on the ''world out there", but on the ontology of 
the observer, that is, what the observer does to bring forth objects in a realm of existence, 
through consensual operations of distinction (Johnson, 1993). Before looking at the 
implications of these concepts for family systems and family therapy it is necessary to 
discuss the application ofthem to systems representing larger orders of inclusion. 
4. 5. 6 Autopoiesis 
Autopoiesis ("self-making") is the name jointly decided by Maturana and Varela 
which characterized their search for a more complete description for the concept of circular 
organization (Capra, 1996). Their interest was not in the properties of the components of 
living systems, but in the processes and relations between the processes as they are 
realized through their components. A given organization can thus be embodied in many 
different manners by many different components. The term "autopoiesis" was finally 
defined as the ''network of production processes, in which the function of each component 
is to participate in the production or transformation of other components in the network" 
(Capra, 1996, p.99). Although their focus on organization as opposed to structure seems 
almost overly emphasized, it must be remembered that science in the Newtonian/Cartesian 
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paradigm was until then very focused on the characteristics of physical components or the 
actual relations between physical components. 
Autopoiesis has been defined for systems in physical space and for computer 
simulations in mathematical spaces. To apply the concept to human social systems has 
been debated quite extensively and have produced various answers. Maturana and Varela 
themselves have different answers to this question. Maturana does not see human social 
systems as being autopoietic, but rather as the "medium in which human beings realize 
their biological autopoiesis through languaging" (Capra, 1996, p.212). Varela (1989) 
agrees that the concept of a network of production processes may not be applicable beyond 
the physical domain, but feels that a broader concept of "organizational closure" can be 
defined for social systems. He went on and generalized the concept of autopoiesis to 
systems representing larger orders of inclusion such as social groups, nations and even 
ecological systems like beehives (Hoffman, 1985). What Varela basically did, was to 
propose that mind-like activity exists at a level above our own individual minds. The 
processes of interaction that define these higher-order unities he referred to as 
"conversational domains" (Varela, 1989). Higher-order unities are thus also instances of 
autonomous systems, although they are not directly accessible to consciousness (Hoffman, 
1985). 
4.6 Implications for Family Systems 
The Ecosystemic paradigm is rooted in an ahemative reality system as was pointed 
out in the previous section. It was realized that not only does it have major implications 
for how we humans organize knowledge, but also how we organize our thinking about 
families and family therapy. Family therapy that uses this paradigm is thus very different 
from family therapy that uses the Western/Cartesian/Newtonian epistemology. Within an 
Ecosystemic epistemology the family is described "as a coevolutionary ecosystem located 
in evolutionary timespace" (Auerswald, 1987, p.322). This means that the family's 
organization is the outcome of an evolutionary process by which some ideas are 
encouraged or confirmed and others die or become extinct. The ideas each family member 
has, lead him/her to behave in ways that confirm or support the ideas of every other family 
member (Bogdan, 1984). First-order as well as second-order cybernetics have both 
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provided concepts which could successfully be applied to the family system to understand 
different phenomena and will therefore be discussed briefly. 
When we view human behaviour from the perspective of first-order cybernetics we 
think in terms of ''recursion and feedback, morphostasis and morphogenesis, rules and 
boundaries, openness and closedness, entropy and negentropy, equifinality and 
equipotentiality, communication and information processing, relationship and wholeness" 
(Becvar & Becvar, 1996, p.83). These terms were all developed in relation to the 
attainment of stability or change, and can only really be understood in a context of stability 
and change. It is beyond the scDpe of this dissertation to go into any depth into any of 
these terms. The cybernetic CDncepts of stability and change as it is maintained through 
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negative and positive feedback will, however, be discussed. in some . detail as they have 
provided rich ground for theorizing around various family systems phenomena. 
From this first-order perspective mutual influence and interaction in systems take 
place in a context of stability and change. Bogdan (1984) therefore states that a model of 
family organization must acwunt for both stability and change. ''Cybernetics proposes 
that change cannot be found \vithout a roof of stability over its head. Similarly, stability 
will always be rooted to underlying processes of change" (Keeney, 1983b, p.48). 
Theorists differ on the emphasis they put on either stability or change or both in their 
theories, depending on what phenomena they want to explain. Speer (in Bogdan, 1984) 
and Ho:ffinan (in Bogdan, 1984) noted that the theory of family homeostasis acoounts for 
the absence of change in families, but appears vague about the processes by which change 
occur. Many therefore believe that the theory of family homeostasis does not have enough 
of a language to account for change (Bogdan, 1984 ). Progression of the family life cycle, 
personal conflict that leads to change, and the fact that therapy sometimes leads to change 
is related to such vague notions as ''recalibrating the rules of the system" (Bogdan, 1984, 
p.379). This might be the case because the impetus for the theory of homeostasis was 
mainly to account for ''resistance" in therapy. Haley (1978), although adhering to the 
homeostatic model, focuses on the fact that change is more the rule than the exception in 
families. Keeney (1983a) introduced the view that a therapist with a cybernetic worldview 
will know that, what to others appear as an either/or issue, is often an analogue or 
metaphor of a system's underlying wmplementary relation between change and stability. 
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Bateson (Anderson et al., 1986) believed that there was a basic epistemological flaw in the 
cybernetic concept of negative feedback and "the related concepts of homeostasis, 
continuous change, symptom functionality, and structural defect" (p.3). Second-order 
cybernetics is a natural development from this homeostatic model and answers the 
questions of the above dilemma. 
Although Varela seemed quite keen to apply Maturana's theory of "organization of 
living systems" to social systems, it still took a while to apply in more detail to family 
systems. Luhmann (in. Capra, 1996) developed the concept of social autopoiesis in 
considerable detail. His central point is that social systems use communication as their 
particular mode of autopoietic reproduction. A family system from this point of view is 
defined as a network of conversations with intrinsic circularities. Conversations usually 
generate further conversation and can in such a way form feedback loops. A result of such 
a closed process can be a shared system of beliefs, explanations, and values that is 
continually supported by further conversation. Family roles and boundaries are 
continually maintained and renegotiated by the autopoietic network of conversations, and 
is therefore continually self-produced (Capra, 1996). 
In sum, cybemeticians basically see people and events in the context of mutual 
interaction and influence and therefore study relationships and how each individual 
interacts with and influences the other (Becvar & Becvar, 1996). ~~~ system influences 
and is therefore being influenced by every other system and every individual influences 
and is being influenced by every other individual. Meaning is derived from this relation 
between individuals and elements as each defines the other. How this view of families 
affects therapy will be deah with Section 4.8. 
4.7 A Reconceptualization of Suicidal Behaviour 
Although the perspective of first-order cybernetics provided us with concepts 
describing interaction and relationshjps in the context of stability and change, the stance is 
still a realist one which sees reality as "out there", able to be observed without being 
influenced. Suicidal behaviour from this perspective is understood as connected to the 
family system and its organization (Becvar & Becvar, 1996). The family is seen as a 
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closed information system feeding information back on itself in the form of a symptom 
Suicidal behaviour will thus be understood to operate as a kind of servomechanism that 
prevents change and in that way to serve a primary family function by maintaining 
stability, continuity, and relationship definition (Anderson et al., 1986). 
Keeney (1983a) believes that "in general, we can view symptomatic behaviour as 
striving toward higher orders of self-correction" (p.165). Suicidal behaviour would thus 
start this process by attempting to change the distorted premises organizing the 
problematic sequence of experience and interaction. It would thus lead its "victim" to 
cybernetic self-correction. Symptomatic behaviour therefore provides the cybernetic 
system with an opportunity to communicate that a particular epistemological premise is 
distorted, erroneous, or ineffective. Correction of this would, according to Keeney (1983a) 
be through unconscious and conscious processes, unconscious ones being respect for the 
ecology of the symptom, and conscious ones through higher-order processes that need to 
include the therapist as well. A few theorists, including Bateson, were not satisfied with 
this explanation of homeostasis and stability to describe living and changing systems and 
the subsequent role of symptoms in it (Anderson, et al., 1986). 
"If you want to understand some phenomenon or appearance, you must consider that 
phenomenon within the context of all completed circuits which are relevant to it" (Bateson; 
1972, p.244). All completed circuits necessarily imply a consideration of the therapeutic 
one. from a second-order perspective it is realized that the observer is part of that which 
is observed and that any explanation is self..referential. Hoffman (1985) states that the old 
epistemology implies that the system creates the problem as a way of attaining some form 
of homeostasis. The new epistemology implies that the problem creates the system 
Problematic behaviour is thus understood to be whatever the "original distress consisted of 
plus whatever the distress on its merry way through the world has managed to stick to 
itself' (Hoffman, 1985, p.387). Suicidal behaviour can thus not be seen as fitting a fixed 
definition focused on individual properties such as intent or degree of consciousness, or as 
having a function of maintaining family homeostasis, but on whatever the system, brought 
together by the suicide, through shared meanings defmes it to be. 
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Membership in these problem determined systems are not bound by existing social 
structures. Problem determined systems might be formed through communications based 
on familial relationships; they may be formed through communications such as legislative 
mandate; or they may be formed through communications based on accident or chance 
relationships (Anderson et al., 1986). The therapist is included as part of the problem 
determined system ''Merely by accepting a referral, the therapist begins to participate in a 
discursive process, and therefore becomes an active communicating member of the 
problem determined system" (Anderson et al., 1986, p.8) 
Anderson et al. (1986) go on to say that through language individuals interact with 
and coordinate behaviour with others in a variety of ways. Languaging around what is 
identified as a problem defines the components of systems that must be worked \Vith in 
treatment. Repairing defective social structures, as determined by a therapist's theoretical 
orientation of descriptions of heahh, pathology, and deviance is therefore not the task 
anymore. ''The problem to be diagnosed and treated, and the membership of the problem 
system, is determined by those in active communication regarding the problem" (Anderson 
et al., 1986, p.7). 
Suicidal behaviour and whatever reactions it brought about might therefore be the 
"problem" that connects and brings a specific system into therapy. That system ''ill not 
necessarily be representative of any existing social structure like the family, but will be 
constituted of everyone that is connected through language around the suicidal behaviour. 
Those in therapy, including the therapist, will through an active discursive process decide 
what the problem will be that will continue to be the focus of therapy. This implies that 
suicidal behaviour might not be the ')Jroblem" to be discussed or conversed about at all. 
An exploration of the system's meanings around suicidal behaviour and its repercussions 
will thus be the focus of therapy only in so far as those in active commlmication regarding 
the problem decides it to be the focus. Since this system includes the therapist as an active 
collaborator, an exploration of his/her meanings and how these are informed and 
maintained by other systems would also be an interesting endeavor. 
The implications of this second-order cybernetic perspective on therapy with suicidal 
behaviour will now be discussed. 
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4.8 Implications of Ecosystemic Thinking for Psychotherapy 
4. 8.1 Introduction 
"What a man desires to know is that (i.e. the external world) but his means of 
knowing is this (i.e. himself). How can he know that? Only by peifecting this." 
(Keeney, 1983a, p.200) 
This statement by Kuan Tsu illustrates the mam postulate of second-order 
cybernetics. To ''know" any external act, like suicidal behaviour, it is crucial to ''know'' 
the more internal act ofthe observation of it. We will therefore only really understand 
suicidal behaviour when we recognize, research and come to an understanding of the 
observer of such an act. Besides the fact that second-order cybernetics provides a way of 
constructing alternative and more complex patterns in the ecology of our experience, it 
also acknowledges the observer's inclusion in the system and therefore the self-referential 
nature of any description. How these basic tenets affect the family therapy field, this 
therapy, as well as the role of the therapist will now be elaborated on. 
4.8.2 No Unitary Theory 
The second-order cybernetic view holds that all knowledge is a construction of the 
mind, and not a fact of reality out there. The consequences for the family therapy field are 
that there are 'no set facts about family, family theory, or family therapy that are 
independent of our observations or our mode of engagement" (Anderson et al., 1986, p.4). 
There is thus no single ''truth" about a family and its problem that needs to be discovered. 
Every intervention is thus seen as part or a broader creative unfolding (Keeney, 1983a). 
Keeney (1983a) goes on to say that when a theorist argues that any one perspective or 
model is more correct than others he/she is admitting to choosing "a way of being 
inflexible" (p.144). Such a therapist's clients will ultimately suffer if they do not fit into 
this punctuated frame of reference. Cybernetic self-correction provides the therapist with 
feedback, which allows him/her to decide which model is usefu~ or not, as well as to what 
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extent that model needs reshaping to fit the unique therapy experience. Keeney (1983a) 
acknowledges that we can only, and must therefore, choose a partial view, model or theory 
and hold to its premises. The process of trying to fit a model to suicidal behaviour will 
generate conversation which will itself provide the feedback necessary to drive the 
therapeutic process. These encounters we have with others' views generate the more 
encompassing perspective that is important. Only through dialogue then can we "get" to 
this higher order ofleaming. 
Not only must the second-order therapist subscribe to a theory around suicidal 
behaviour that makes sense to him/herself, but also allow conversation around it, 
conversations in various systems which include dialogue with his/her fraternity as well as 
with his/her clients around the topic. Throughout this endeavor a more encompassing 
view and understanding of suicidal behaviour will therefore come to the fore. 
4.8.3 First-order vs. Second-order Cybernetics (To be or not to be part of therapy) 
Pragmatically, you do not need cybernetics of cybernetics to be a family therapist. 
Becvar and Becvar (1996) name many reasons why you may not want to be a systemic 
family therapist at a second-order level, while Hoffinan (1985, p.394) adds that 
''nonneutral, 'linear' attitudes and actions are often 1) necessary, 2) appropriate, 3) what 
you are paid for". It is, however, necessary to realize that, while at the level of simple 
cybernetics you may be "doing good", at the same time you may be contributing to 
escalating pathology in society. You could be feeding the illusion of certainty and the 
status quo of existing social relationships and structures (Becvar & Becvar, 1996). If you 
decide to incorporate a higher order of cybernetics in your therapeutic life, you accept the 
responsibility for participating in developing the problems experienced by our society, the 
same problems you must subsequently attempt to solve. Being consciously aware of this 
paradox forces you to live a rather schizophrenic life (Becvar & Becvar, 1996). 
Many theorists provide ways of dealing with this paradox when the decision is made 
to utilize the position of self-reference and participation flowing from this approach. 
Keeney (1983a, p.82) states that ''we do not throw away the pragmatic advantages gained 
by a first-order view", but that we rather contextualize the pragmatics of it. He suggests 
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that a perspective that brings the therapist fully into therapy can do this. Atkinson and 
Heath (1987) believe that any existing family therapy model can be applied in a way that is 
or is not consistent with the implications of second-order cybernetics. They therefore 
agree with Keeney that therapists must continue to draw upon the more pragmatic first-
order models as long as they do not become too attached to their clients' acceptance of 
their suggestions and interventions. Bateson (1972) also states that we may continue 
committing epistemological errors as long as we know we are committing them He 
labeled this awareness "wisdom". Dell (1985) takes the position that as long as we are 
aware that we are always operating in the context of a self-recursive network, it does not 
matter what epistemologies we use or what theories we adopt. Efran, Lukens and Lukens 
(1988) say that constructivist therapists can claim professional expertise in their ways of 
working with a family. They are, however, not entitled to claim that they are fixing 
objective problems that have an existence independent of the human language community. 
It is agreed among various theorists that as therapists we cannot get away from the fact that 
we operate in a first-order way. The fact that we realize this, that we have conversations 
around it and that we constantly try to'better the situation makes therapy a second-order 
endeavor. 
Historical data suggest that higher-order problems can emerge when we attempt 
pragmatic solutions to problems without examining the underlying framework that defines 
the problem as a problem, thus having a limited awareness of the context in which the 
• 
problem exists (Becvar & Becvar, 1996). When dealing with suicidal behaviour in therapy 
it would entail the following. We need to invest in developing theories and models to deal 
with suicidal behaviour in a pragmatic and effective way. We also need to be aware of the 
context in which these models and theories exist. We need to be aware that most of our 
theories around suicidal behaviour focus on assessment and prevention, not because it is 
the only and 'nght" way that we can deal with it, but because we as therapists live in a 
society where we have taken the responsibility for trying to control such behaviour through 
these means. We as therapists should be aware that we are part of the suicide business. 
We should be aware that by evolving theories to prevent suicide and in a first-order way to 
solve the problem of suicide, we are on a higher level creating a context where suicidal 
behaviour is allowed. We are therefore feeding the realist illusion of certainty and the 
status quo of existing social relationships. We are communicating that we can effectively 
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assess, predict and prevent suicide, that we as ex'J)erts "know better''. "Know better", not 
because we actually know better on all levels, but mainly because we are in a society that 
frantically wants us to know better, as well as part of a fraternity that frantically wants to 
communicate that they know better. 
We should thus be aware that by effectively taking responsibility for and preventing 
suicide, we as professionals are on a higher level communicating another message to 
society, a message which should be investigated and become part of higher-order 
conversations. We can thus see that higher-order cybernetics confronts .us with our 
finiteness, with uncertainty, and with the demand to define our own essence (W atzlawick, 
Beavin & Jackson, 1967), something with which the analysis of our own epistemology can 
greatly assist us. 
4.8.4 Epistemology 
The fundamental act of epistemology is to draw a distinction. All that we know, or 
can know, rests . upon the distinctions ~e draw. Bateson referred to this activity as 
£~ChJation (Keeney, 1982). The task of epistemology in therapy entails knowing how 
clients construct their world of experience. At the same time therapists folio"\' sy~ems of 
punctuating that prescribe how they describe. A complete epistemology of family therapy 
must therefore look at how both client and therapist construct a "therapeutic reality" 
(Keeney, 1982, p.157). Therapy therefore becomes a study of epistemology, not only of 
the client, but also a study of the therapist's epistemology. 
The "study of epistemology in therapy'' entails that a therapist not only join his/her 
clients in the social construction of a therapeutic reality, but also take responsibility for the 
world of experience that is created (Keeney, 1983a). Coming to know your own 
epistemology, be it revealed through deconstruction of narrative, metacommunication or 
dialogical dialectic, is no easy process (Maranhao, 1990). So difficuh a process is it, that 
Auerswald (1985) remarks that "only a handful of people in the field have thought 
seriously enough about epistemological issues to transform their thinking into print". This 
higher-order view, or as Keeney (1982) refers to it, a metaepistemology or 
metapunctuation, requires a dialogue between constructing and seeing. Epistemology can 
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thus be seen to be a recursive process. Keeney (1983a) describes the cybernetic therapist 
as a practitioner, theorist, and researcher all at the same time. A therapist must therefore be 
able to "construct models, package them as interventions, and discern what happens" 
(p.172). He refers to this recursive process, where the facets of therapeutic process are 
reconnected, as sociofeedback. 
The consciousness of one's productions provides a context of reflexivity. It allows 
for new alternatives regarding oneself and one's relationships. ''Knowing about mind 
through mind(ing) or communication through (meta)communication is a self-referential 
process where the dualistic framing of ontology and epistemology coalesce" (Keeney, 
1983b) 
Becvar and Becvar (1996), with their focus on the therapist's epistemological 
development, compares therapy to Zen, in that it becomes a context of higher order 
learning for a therapist. Therapy is thus seen as a vehicle for the therapist's 
epistemological change, a context for practice that could be reflected on. They also state 
that a therapist who realizes and acknowledges that he/she is part of such a learning 
context will eventually experience his/her world in a profoundly different way. Such a 
therapist will have learned to construct patterns that connect. It is thus necessary for a 
therapist to be "selfish" sometimes. A therapist needs to be aware that only when he/she 
acknowledges his/her position in therapy by conscious exploration of his/her own 
premises, as metaphors for his/her epistemological position, will his/her client ultimately 
benefit from a therapeutic endeavor. 
When dealing with suicidal behaviour we as therapists should make a conscious 
effort to know how it is that our clients and ourselves view suicidal behaviour, as well as 
how these views came about. We should not only join in, but also take the responsibility 
for this process. We should therefore use narrative and metac.ommunication to "talk 
suicide" in an explorative and investigative way. When we adopt this attitude it will 
become clear very quickly that we do not really "know'' what individual suicidal behaviour 
is. That although we have definitions and demographics to help us assess and predict 
(sometimes very effectively) suicidal behaviour, we lack an in-depth understanding of the 
individual phenomenon. That we are therefore also learners in this process. 
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4.8.5 Redefining 'Therapist'' 
During the first-order cybernetic movement, it was believed that the therapist had a 
"duty" to alter pathological family homeostasis (Hoffman, 1981), that the therapist would 
be able to adopt a "metaposition" or external position to the system (Hoffman, 1990), and 
that the therapist could control or manipulate a system he/she was working with, in order 
to "cause" change (Dell, 1985; Hoffman, 1990; Keeney, 1983a). The position with regards 
to the role of therapist in second-order cybernetics is not so clear, however. 
Evans (1992) says that it seems that the therapist's role might have become vague 
and slightly confused with the constructivist trend toward doing away with the "power" or 
"authority" ofthe therapist. Anderson and Goolishian (1988) advocate a position of"not 
knowing", and Hoffman (1993, p.l27) "a kind of deliberate ignorance". Most researchers 
realize that the role of the therapist within this paradigm is very different from what it was 
in the past, and offers descriptive suggestions to this new role. ~~~~~~.~!~.!J}9~~L~X, lrJ3 
that the role of the therapist needs to be redefined to "one who co-creates through his or 
-- • ~ _ <•> w, .. ,•·~.< -' '•' !< ~'""'~•·"'"'"·"'•""·" >'•~"·--~·· · · • ' •r •' •"'" • • "~'-" " ·•· •• • ····''•"'-'·'" V '•" ,,_,, •. ,. •~ •""·~ "'-'- ···~"'!<""<•~' ""'' ·"" , H~"J•.r."'"•'->'•"t ~ 
her own theoretical lenses what facts there are to be observed" (p.6). The therapist is 
.--~·· .,.,_,....,.~,,-~ --·"---~ 
therefore described as an active communicating member in the problem-determined 
---~---·--»••>~"~'~" --~·""~ .. o<oeVo~o o "" __ _,......., ___ .,,~~---·"'"'~'~'~~-·--~._, -•-•<<0 '"-'-'•"'"~•'<''HF~"" ""''" '"'·~'~'"•'-'J•••·--~·-""''""'~---··'"""''•<»0"'-""" -·-~-~ ... ., .... ~,...,_,.,.,.,~,0<""'•""'•"'~',>'o'"''~''"~'"""''''"~'''""''"'"'"""~»"<>- "0 
system. Keeney (1983a) also chooses to include the therapist more directly in the therapy 
-"""""""""""'"""'~'''"'''"''''"'"''"'"' 
by pointing out that a context must be structured where both therapist and client can 
successfully respond to the self-corrective communication of symptomatic behaviour and 
thereby create sociofeedback. 
Auerswald (1985) describes the therapist as a "nonblaming ecological detective" 
(p.6). The task of such a therapist would thus be to seek out and identify the ecological 
event that led the family to the position they are in. Anderson et al. (1986) suggest that the 
therapist do this by simply engaging in conversation with those who are relevant to the 
problem situation. They therefore view the disruption of families as coercive and choose 
not to define their therapy in that way. When therapy requires languaging with the family 
within their domain of understanding, every course of therapy is different and 
commonalities across problems, diagnoses or solutions do not exist (Anderson et al., 
1986). "Packaged cookbook cures" would be worthless if they are not "adequately 
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coupled to the ecology" (Keeney & Sprenkle, 1982, p.16) ofthe client. Hoffinan (19J..Q) 
~lso"_p~~!i:~Y~_s .. -~-~~- ~~~~-.!~~--P!9xt4iJlg. str~t~gies, .. iJl,t~;r~t~!i?~~: ~! .. ~~~~.~!<!~~ .. ,~?.~ .. ~M N B 
behavioural change, the ther!lp!st:'.~j()Q i§lo .. create .. a .context foLepig~tpological change. 
'v ''""'u•~·o'''"'"i".•'f<• .~;;,,,~C•'•~-"'b''''"'"''" •·"'•oc '""''-"'"'·•·•·"~'"'-'0'' '-4 ;>, '<"""' ""'-''f.~~~~' 
f_ .. !!~~ (l?~?)~es the most applicable summary of this vague new description of 
ae~-ord~~.~~:.r~g_j.St and refers to it as no more than a second-order stance. She makes 
it clear tliit' any therapy that respects a cybernetic epistemology will not be focused on a 
specific method, but would rather be characterized by a certain attitude. She mentions the 
following characteristics of such a stance (Hoffinan, 1985, p.393): 
An "observing system" stance and inclusion of the therapist's own context. 
A collaborative rather than a hierarchical structure. 
Goals that emphasize setting a context for change, not specifying a chJife. N f3 
Ways to guard against too much instrumentality. 
A "circular" assessment of the problem 
A nonpejorative, nonjudgmental view. 
''(;;'-~-); ... _____ ... 
~\ .,!/' 
\./ CHoffinan (1985) continues to say that a second-order approach also promotes a high 
(
olerance for diversity in therapy. A therapist would thus feel comfortable with including 
methods from other therapeutic schools if he/she is clear about the way and the reasons 
why it is done. 
A vague non-directive stance like the above makes it extremely difficult to apply to 
therapy with specific problematic behaviour (in this case suicidal behaviour). How a 
therapist ''is" in therapy with specifically suicidal behaviour appears not to be the issue 
anymore. Suicidal behaviour has mostly been (and sometimes still is) seen as irrational, 
mad or bad. This view has made it easier for the professional dealing with it to act in a 
controlling, preventative and sometimes even coercive manner. When a second-order 
stance is adopted, a linear excuse for therapeutic behaviour is not seeked anymore, but the 
emphasis is on understanding the meaning ofthe suicidal behaviour in a specific context. 
One almost gets the idea that therapeutic behaviour is divorced from the problematic 
(suicidal) behaviour. This would ask for a nonjudgmental, collaborative, exploring 
attitude. 
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Ahhough the severity of suicidal behaviour is realized, it is still treated in a non-
controlling manner. For this to happen it would also be necessary for the therapist to 
explore his/her own context. His/her meanings around suicide, death, and responsibility 
for suicidal behaviour in therapy (to name just a few) would thus be the topic of much 
higher-order conversations, something with which epistemology can greatly assist us. 
Auerswald (1987) states that if we become aware of our epistemological premises we can 
then also decide if family therapy is "simply another modality of treatment among the 
many", or if it would represent "a radically different way of thinking" (pp.324-325). 
4.8.6 Diagnosis vs. Meaning 
Another consequence of second-order cybernetic thinking involves the focus of our 
attention and energy in therapy. Hoffinan (1985, p.390) says that if we abandon the 
"expert-dummy model, we have to throw away the idea of diagnosis as well". The 
emphasis would shift "from a concern with the etiology of the problem to a concern with 
the meanings that are attached to it" (Hoffinan, 1985, p.390). This means an exploration 
ofwhat Bateson (Anderson et al., 1986) calls the "ecology ofthe mind" or "ecology of 
ideas" which determine the behaviour and problems for which therapy is requested. 
\ 
\, 
When exploring meanings the treatment unit necessarily changes in that the "system 
doesn't create the problem" anymore, but the '~roblem creates the system" (Hoffinan, 
1985, p.386). To think of therapy in terms of a "conversational domain" would imply that 
therapists focus not on the client (symptom carrier) as the unit of attention, but would 
therefore see the entire group or family, including professionals, as a small evolving 
meaning system (Hoffinan, 1985). The goal of therapy is to provide, through 
conversation, a context wherein the actors in the '~roblem determined system" no longer 
distinguish what they are thinking and talking about as a problem The language used by 
the system is thus changed. In such a context the problem-determined system would think 
and talk differently about their problem No change is necessarily sought in the structure 
of the social system or in observed behaviour, but in the language used to describe the 
problem (Anderson et al., 1986). 
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A consequence of such a stance in therapy would be that much less time would be 
spent in determining how lethal, intentional, conscious a specific behaviour is and more of 
a focus on the meaning of it in a specific context. Definitions or descriptions of suicidal 
behaviour would thus be situational and only applicable to a specific unique context. The 
exploration of context would also not be directed at finding a "cause" for the behaviour to 
ultimately remove the "cause" and therefore stop the behaviour from occurring, but to get 
to an understanding of it. A change would be seeked in how the problem is languaged 
about. This entails that suicidal behaviour might not cease, but that the meanings around it 
and how it is spoken about would be different. This applies not only to the client or 
system's meanings around it, but also to that of the therapist. Only when therapist 
meanings around suicidal behaviour change, will subsequent therapeutic behaviour be 
different. 
When a therapist understands that he/she is an active epistemological operator, he/she 
also realizes that he/she is always participating in the construction of a world of 
experience. The view of participatory universe suggests that ethics, rather than objectivity, 
is the foundations of family therapy. The therJPist is thus responsible for contributing to 
the construction of therapeutic realities (Keeney, 1982). 
4.8.7 Language and Meaning 
From a constructivist perspective, what is observed in living systems, is constructed, 
partly by the observer and partly by the observed (Von Glasersfeld, 1984). This 
construction is done in language, both internally by the observer to him-/herseU: and 
externally, in communication with others (Efran et al., 1988). Language, a digital 
representational system of our experience, therefore not only represents our experience to 
ourselves but "re-presents (communicates) our representations of our experience to others" 
(Keeney, 1983b, p.46). Internally, the observer makes distinctions between what is 
observed and what is known through the use of personal constructs, that is, meanings. 
Externally meanings are exchanged by means of vernal and non-verbal language 
(Anderson & Goolishian, 1988). This continued exchange of meaning leads to the co-
construction of a particular reality for that system 
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The ways in which we form these representations or descriptions reflect implicit 
epistemologies (i.e., ''the rules for descn'bing, categorizing and knowing our experience") 
(Keeney, 1983b, p.46). Bateson and Von Foerster (Keeney, 1983b) suggest that we 
restructure our linguistic patterning when talking about systems and cybernetics. They 
state that we have to be careful in how we pattern our observations and descriptions, and to 
not demarcate the circuitry into isolated elements or mechanisms. A constructivist 
epistemology would imply that we always remain aware of the context in which behaviour 
occurs. 
4.9 Criticism 
By stating that all '1-ealities" are constructed, constructivists make a realist claim, 
turning their epistemology into merely another form of realism This paradox has been 
recognized and described by others, for example, Held and Pols (in Fourie, 1996), and 
emphasizes that the constructivist epistemology is as much a construction as they claim 
-.....__., ~' 
realism Qr ~· any other perceived perspective to be. Criticism against second-order 
cybernetics as a way of illuminating constructivist postulates will therefore also include 
variations of the above basic criticism and will be elaborated on. 
The main criticism directed at second-order cybernetics involves doubts concerning 
its most relevant contribution, namely the ethical stance of collaboration. Becvar and 
Becvar (1996) point out that the context of therapy necessarily transforms observing 
systems to observed systems in spite of the best intentions of the therapist. It is this fact 
about second-order cybernetics with which some theorists have a problem, They believe 
that it is more ethical for the therapist to assume the expert role and move the client system 
toward 'hormal functioning" than to manipulate it by "unconscious persuasion of second-
order therapies" (p.293). Golann (in Becvar & Becvar, 1996) represents one of those 
theorists. He criticizes second-order cybernetic models as representing a form of 
manipulation and thus of acquiring power in therapy by denying it. ''Power obscured 
eventually emerges- a therapeutic wolf clad as second-order sheep" (p.292). He states 
that "unconscious persuasion" could be viewed as ethically more objectionable than 
excessive and explicit strategic intervention, because it is potentially dishonest and 
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therefore creates an even greater power hierarchy in favour of the therapist than other 
forms of therapy. 
Becvar and Becvar (1996) focus on the ''use" of second-order theories and say that 
these models are just as seductive as traditional models to therapists who are in search of 
the "best" way to do respectful, non-manipulative, non-normative therapy. The problem is 
therefore seen in how the theories are used, and not in. the theories per se. They suggest 
that part of the problem may lie in the process of transforming the philosophy that is 
second-order cybernetics into a formal, pragmatic model for therapy, a process that 
necessarily transforms observing systems to observed systems. This process is confusing 
mainly because epistemologies are used inconsistently (Auerswald, 1987). ''Ecosystemic 
writers revert back to the thought system in which they are originally programmed" 
(Auerswald, 1987, p.324). Auerswald goes on to say that there is no "error" in the new 
thought system, but that the both-and rule replaces any such dichotomous thinking. To 
therefore want to develop a theory (which is basically a linear way of explaining 
behaviour) could never violate the circular epistemology of second-order cybernetics if 
you apply this both-and rule consistently. 
The both-and rule however does not imply that "anything goes", a criticism often 
made against constructivism Constructivists maintain that some realities are more valid or 
useful than others. The usefulness or validity of a theory can be determined by the way it 
fits with the wishes, attributions, ideas and conceptions of the people involved in co-
constructing it and not by any objective norm (Fourie, 1996). 
4.10 Conclusion 
In this chapter it has been shown how the theory of second-order cybernetics 
provided concepts which changed how living systems were talked about and in that way 
represented an ecosystemic perspective on living systems. It provided a perspective where 
living systems are seen as autonomous and structure-determined and can attain structural 
plasticity with other organisms in consensual domains. Through this view it was realized 
that objectivity could only exist in parentheses since all language is self-referential and 
represents attempts to maintain an organism's circular organization. Cybernetics, with its 
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emphasis on feedback mechanisms, extended the notion of co-ontogeny with concepts 
such as recursiveness and reciprocal causality and in that way emphasized the circular 
organization of living systems. Although the homeostatic concepts of stability and change 
are very useful in describing patterns of communication in living systems, they do not fully 
take into account the autopoietic nature of living systems. It took theoretical concepts of 
cybernetics of cybernetics to do this in a theoretically sound way. It was realized that, 
since living systems are autopoietic and that we as therapists enter into a consensual 
domain with our clients, all our observations, ahhough influenced by this co-ontogenic 
i 
structural drift, are still self-referential. Our observations can never address an objective J 
world "out there" but are only representative of how our structure allows us to "see" 
reality. 
Suicidal behaviour, like all '~roblematic behaviour'' brought to therapy, would thus 
not be an "easy" assessment with "easy" answers and ways of working. Suicidal 
behaviour would not be seen as residing in the individual's (1) biochemistry, (2) psyche, 
(3) cognition, (4) family, (5) other systems including the therapeutic one, or in (6) society 
as a whole, but in all of it. Special significance will also be given to how the individual 
exhibiting suicidal behaviour understands and organizes all of the mentioned factors to 
understand his/her behaviour. Implications for the therapist include realizing all the above, 
but to refrain from "controlling" the life-threatening behaviour by focussing on one aspect 
in an attempt to change it to make the suicidal behaviour disappear. 
Psychotherapy becomes a conversational or narrative process in which the 
entrenched constellation of meanings around a problem is facilitated to evolve in a 
direction where the consensual definition of the problem as a problem is no longer central. 
A different 'l"eality'' is therefore co-constructed by all those partaking in therapy 
(Hoffinan, 1990). 
In the next chapter the process of researching suicide will be discussed. An 
ecosystemic perspective also has implications for research. This will also be addressed. 
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CHAPTERS 
RESEARCH ON SUICIDAL BEHAVIOUR 
5.1 Introduction 
In any research area, problems of design and intetpretation must be solved before 
valid conclusions can be drawn. Some of these problems are general to all research, while 
others are unique to a particular topic. In this chapter, some of the specific methodological 
difficulties of investigating suicide will be discussed. It would also be suggested that a 
second-order (as informed by a constructivist) perspective on suicide research makes some 
of the perceived issues irrelevant. This chapter will be concluded with a proposal for a 
qualitative research project applicable to moral and ethical issues that suicide presents us 
with. 
5.2 Methodological Problems in Suicide Research 
It is not infrequent in behavioural research for researchers to use a particular term or 
name to describe a phenomenon. When results are compared to those of others, they, 
however, find apparent contradictions because the same label was used for different things 
or different labels for the same thing. Although most researchers agree that the greatest 
methodological issue in suicide research concerns the adequate definition of the behaviour, 
related issues such as data gathering and reliance on official data to provide demographic 
information also has it flaws. The mentioned difficulties will be discussed in some depth 
in this section. 
5.2.1 Defining Suicidal Behaviour 
At the outset suicide appears clear and obvious. As Shneidman (1985, p.10) puts it, 
''there is a dead person, a gun in his hand, a hole in his head, and a letter lying open on the 
table". He also goes on and offers a less concrete definition of suicide as "an act of self-
inflicted intentional cessation" (p.l1). The Concise Oxford Dictionary (Sykes, 1982, 
p.l067) describes the noun "suicide" as ''when a person intentionally kills himself/hersel£ 
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intentional self-slaughter", while the Collins Cobuild English Dictionary (Sinclair et al, 
1995, p.1672) states that ''people who commit suicide deliberately kill themselves because 
they do not want to continue living". Lester (1997a, p.1) mentions another dictionary 
definition where suicide is descnbed as the act or instance of voluntarily or intentionally 
taking one's own life. 
Ahhough the above definitions are relatively obvious and simple to understand, most 
researchers agree that when trying to understand an individual suicide, the definitions show 
a lack of fit with the actual suicidal behaviour. Several aspects of suicide make the process 
of fitting a specific suicide with a definition a difficult process. The (a) actual suicidal 
behaviour (Farberow, 1980; Lester, 1997a); (b) intent of the person engaging in the 
behaviour (Farberow, 1980; Lester, 1997a); (c) degree of consciousness preceding the 
suicidal act (Farberow, 1980; Lester, 1997a); (d) basic criteria for defining death (Kalish, 
1968; Lester, 1997a); (e) variations of the meaning of suicide when considering the context 
in which it takes place (Lester, 1997a; Stillion & McDowell, 1996); and (f) definition of 
the self (Smart, 1980) are all aspects that make it difficult to conceptualize suicidal 
behaviour. The mentioned issues and how they influence the process of defining 
behaviour as suicidal or not, will be discussed very briefly. Although important to realize 
the extent of conceptual difficulties experienced, it is the writer's point of view that getting 
stuck in the classification of behaviour as suicidal or not, becomes part of the context 
where a therapeutically more meaningful understanding of suicidal behaviour will elude 
us. 
(a) Actual Suicidal Behaviour 
Lester (1997a) describes six categories of overt suicidal behaviour namely: 
completed suicide, attempted suicide, suicide threats, thoughts of suicide, no 
preoccupations with suicide, and suicidal gesture. The last refers to attempts that do not 
involve a real intent to die. Subdivisions of the above categories have been proposed by a 
few, while some have objected to many of the terms describing the categories and have 
suggested renaming some of them 
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The "attempted" category of the classification has conceptually received the most 
attention by researchers. Dorpat and Boswell (1963) subdivided the "attempted suicide 
category" into gestures, ambivalent attempt and serious (potentially lethal) attempts. 
Kreitman, Philip, Greer and Bagley (1969) suggested renaming the "attempted suicide", 
"parasuicide" to get away from the notion that attempters are really trying to kill 
themselves. Nowadays however, many researchers favour the more specific "self-injury", 
"self-poisoning" and "deliberate self-harm", and therefore do not use the term 
"parasuicide" much (Canetto & Lester, 1995). Some outrightly objected to the 
"attempted" category, saying that this term implies that attempters have somehow failed to 
finish the act, while completers have succeeded. They suggested referring to these 
behaviours as "nonfatal" and ''fatal" suicide respectively (Canetto & Lester, 1995). Lester 
( 1997 a) continues by stating that dividing the protagonists into "attempters" and 
"completers" is a gross simplification, because all suicidal acts occur along a continuum 
that ranges from highly lethal to non-injurious. 
(b) Intent 
The one common denominator of the definitions of suicide, is the use of the word 
"intentional" to descn'be the act. Most researchers see this as the most valuable way of 
categorizing suicidal behaviour (Lester, 1997a). Beck and his colleagues (Beck, 
Weissman, Lester & Trexler, 1976) proposed a scale of suicidal intent based on the 
"objective circumstances" of the suicidal act (such as whether the suicidal person isolated 
himself/herself and whether he/she left a suicide note) and, in the case of attempters, on 
their answers to questions posed to them. Smart (1980) observed that "objectively" 
determining the intent of specific behaviour is a very difficult process, particularly if the 
person under investigation is already dead. Seriousness and intent are also rarely reported. 
To complicate the case of intention even more, Lester (1997a, p.8) correctly points out, 
that 'just because a suicide implies voluntary action, does not mean that the person really 
want( ed) to die". More often than not, a suicidal person simply wants to escape and sees 
<leath as the only way out of a painful situation. 
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(c) Consciousness or Awareness of Suicidal Behaviour 
Another important dimension of the definition of suicidal behaviour concerns a 
person's degree of consciousness or awareness preceding the suicidal act (Lester, 1997a). 
This implies that not all fonns of suicide are consciously planned, but that the impulse 
toward suicide can be unconscious and that this may resuh in unplanned "accidental" 
deaths. This idea is historically associated with Menninger and his book ''Man Against 
Himself' (1938). He considers asceticism, alcoholism, and martyrdom as "chronic 
suicide", self-mutilations, malingering, and purposive accidents as "social suicide", and 
psychological factors in organic disease as "organic suicide" (Smart, 1980). Others 
believe that a variety of self-destructive behaviours are, if only in part, suicidally 
motivated. Such acts will include chronic overeating, anorexia, self-mutilation, medication 
abuse and repeated risk-taking (Lester, 1997a). Farberow (1980) calls this ''indirect self-
destructive behaviour", and goes on to say that ahhough the suicide event at first seemed 
clearly identifiable, it is not the case anymore. 
(d) Definition of Death 
For centuries people believed that there is a definite moment when the transition from 
life to death occurs. Advances in medicine have raised legitimate questions about exactly 
when death occurs. This has led us to reexamine not only our understanding of physical 
death and when it occurs, but also our understanding of psychological death and when it 
takes place (Lester, 1997a). When a person partakes in behaviour that makes the 
likelihood of death increase, it again raises the question of exactly when death occurs. Life 
and death is thus not such a black and white issue anymore. It is almost as if people 
exhibiting suicidal behaviour also struggle with this exact issue, their game is, however, 
not only academic, but dangerously experiential. 
Menninger (1938) described suicide as a peculiar form of death that entails three 
elements: the element of dying, the element of killing, and the element of being killed. No 
matter how one looks at it, suicide involves death, intended or not. It is therefore expected 
that the study of suicide and specifically the definition of the behaviour should include an 
understanding of death itself 
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To allow for a more meaningful understanding of death, a few classifications of death 
states will be mentioned and described. The first classification defines physical death as it 
is experienced by the dying person and those caring for the person, and includes the 
subcategories of (1) cessation (i.e., the stopping of any conscious experience); (2) 
termination (i.e., the end of the body's physiological functioning); (3) interruption (i.e., 
the temporary stopping of conscious awareness) and (4) continuation (i.e., the ongoing 
continuation of conscious experience (Shneidman, 1968). The established medical scheme 
for classifying states of death include the following four self-explanatory modes: 
accidental death, homicide, suicide, and natural death (Lester, 1997a). This scheme 
stresses the causes and the modes of death and is utilized for the ascription of 
responsibility for death to the right source or cause. Lester believes that it does not allow 
fine enough distinctions for use when a person has been motivated to seek his own death 
though. 
Shneidman (1968) provides a classification that does involve the role of the deceased 
in his/her own death. Subcategories include (1) intentional death, when the person plays 
a direct and conscious role in his/her own death; (2) subintentional death, when the 
person plays an indirect, covert or unconscious role in his/her death; (3) unintentional 
death, when the person plays no significant role in his/her own death; and (4) 
contraintentioned death, when the person acts as if he/she is about to die or threatens to 
commit suicide, but has no intention of doing so. 
From a study done by Kalish in 1965 (Lester, 1997a) it became clear that self-
destruction would be more likely if a person were considered subjectively dead even 
though he/she was still living and conscious. Although the mentioned classifications are 
important for an understanding of death and suicidal behaviour, the most applicable 
classification would therefore be the one by Kalish (1968). This is the case because it 
considers the "subjective judgement" of the conditions under which a person is considered 
dead. Kalish names four basic criteria for defining death. Physical death refers to either 
biological death, when the organs stop to function, or clinical death, when the organism no 
longer functions but the organs continue to live. When the individual ceases to be aware of 
his/her own exi~ence, it is. considered to be psychological death. Social _d~th can be 
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self-perceived or perceived by others. When self-perceived, the individual accepts the 
notion that he/she is, for all practical purposes, dead. Other-perceived social death 
involves behaviour by people who know the individual as if he/she is dead or nonexistent. 
Lastly, anthropological death refers to the individual being cut off from a particular 
community and referred to as being dead. 
ln his introduction ofthe concept ofthe "appropriate death" Lester (1970) states 
that in personal commup.ication with Gene Brockopp, she suggested that a death could be 
considered "appropriate". when these different kinds of death coincide in time. If a person 
therefore dies anthropologically, socially, psychologically and physically at the same time, 
then his/her death may be considered "appropriate". With this in mind he suggested that a 
therapist's duty would thus be to make sure a person dies an "appropriate" death. He 
however realized that this process is a judgemental and subjective one and that before this 
stance is taken one must be aware of one's own as well as other's concepts around this 
ISSUe. 
(e) Meanings of Suicide 
Depending upon the dominant thinking in any given society, the act of suicide has 
been deemed a crime, a rational and honorable act, evidence of insanity, a sin, and a 
failure to cope. (Stillion & McDowell, 1996, p.38) 
Suicidal behaviour has had different meanings at different times and in different 
circumstances throughout Western culture. The existence of all these views of suicide 
points up both the complexities inherent in understanding an individual act of suicide and 
the need for examining the context within which suicide is studied. Stillion and McDowell 
(1996) recognized the importance ofunderstanding suicide within a cohort or generational 
setting. They accepted Strauss and Howe's (in Stillion & McDowell, 1996) definitions for 
each of the existing cohorts alive today to illuminate suicidal behaviour. Cohler and 
Jenuwine (1995) see suicidal behaviour as a function not only of cohort, but ads aging, 
gender and ethnicity as functions influencing its meaning. 
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A few researchers have focused on the socia~ situational, and family contexts to 
understand suicidal despair (Aldridge, 1984; Aldridge & Dallos, 1986; Chamberlain, 1995; 
Haley, 1978; Miller, 1995; Osgood, 1989; Pfeffer, 1981; Richman, 1986). Others have 
understood suicidal behaviour by focusing on the communication and · interaction 
predominant in these families (Chamberlain, 1995; Kerfoot, 1980; Pfeffer, 1981; Pillay & 
Wassenaar, 1995; Richman, 1979; Wagner, 1997; Wassenaar, 1987). These theories were 
elaborated on in Chapter 3. 
Why is it important for theorists to distinguish between categories of suicidal 
behaviour? Lester (1997a) says that attempted (nonfatal) suicides and completed (fatal) 
suicides should be regarded as different forms ofbehaviour. There is also the longstanding 
belief that the different labels created to describe suicidal behaviour refer to different kinds 
of people (Lester, 1997a). A further deduction was that the classification of suicidal 
behaviour in one of the categories would alter the choice of treatment and intervention 
(Orbach, 1988). The fact that either category ofbehaviour may accidentally turn out into 
its opposite indicates that ahhough helpful to know about, definitions can never replace a 
true understanding of individual behaviour. 
5.2.2 Methods oflnvestigation 
Research on suicide almost always involves correlational rather than experimental 
methods (Lester, 1997a). Demographic studies are relied upon to provide the data and 
therefore make up a large volume of research done on the subject. Before a few 
demographic facts are mentioned, the problems with these methods will be discussed 
briefly. 
(a) Gathering Data 
Because researchers studying completed suicide cannot get information from dead 
individuals, they must rely on two less satisfactory methods of investigation, namely ( 1) 
the study of residual evidence or (2) the study of substitute subjects, for example, people 
who have attempted suicide. 
61 
Residual evidence can be obtained from examining written material or other evidence 
left behind, for example, suicide notes, diaries, letters and results of previously obtained 
psychological tests. Another option is to gather information from the suicide's friends and 
relatives. Ahhough some researchers have devised structured methods like "psychological 
autopsies" (Maris, 1986) for interviewing the friends and relatives of people who 
committed suicide, observational distortion and lack of validity of the information is 
named as problems with this method (Lester, 1997a). Another problem with using residual 
evidence is the proper establishment of control groups. With what, for example, can 
suicide notes be compared? 
When substitute subjects (e.g., people who have attempted suicide), as representative 
of completed suicides, are used as a means of studying suicidal behaviour, problems of 
reliability and validity come to the fore. 
(b) Demographics 
The study of the distribution of suicide in a population allows for the establishment of 
general associations between suicide and the characteristics of individuals who kill 
themselves. Variables such as age, gender, marital status, religious affiliations, and 
occupational status can be examined (Blumenthal & Kupfer, 1990). The rates obtained 
from epidemiological studies of the general population is most often utilized to supply 
public health officials with the necessary information to set up programs of prevention 
among high-risk groups and to establish centers in those areas where the problems are 
most severe (Buda & Tsuang, 1990). 
The reason for including this section is twofold. Firstly it will provide the reader 
with an overall idea of the basic characteristics and magnitude of what we are dealing with 
when talking about suicidal behaviour. It would become clear that no person is exempt 
from this behaviour, and that proportions are becoming endemic (Richman, 1986). 
Secondly it is included to show that although the study of demographics makes up a huge 
percentage of research done on suicidal behaviour, it does not necessarily provide 
acceptable solutions to the problem Some will go so far as to say that it is in effect 
becoming part of the problem The demographics and the subsequent use of it to develop 
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programmes to prevent suicidal behaviour have become part of the social discourse around 
it. It emphasizes the powerlessness of professionals to prevent it from occurring, and has 
lead to the imagery ofhopelessness and extinction of our species. As Lifton (1991, p.467) 
notes, "it is hard to tell whether there is an actual increase of suicide in our time, and if 
there is, whether this imagery of extinction plays a significant part". 
(i) The relationship between suicide and attempted suicide 
National statistics on attempted suicide are not available for the majority of countries. 
Diekstra and Moritz (1987) report that research centres in several countries have collected 
data on attempted suicide over a considerate period of time from which deductions could 
be made. Attempted suicide rates in Third World countries, however, almost always go 
unreported, mainly because it was deemed a punishable legal offence until very recently in 
some of them (e.g., India) (Latha, Bhat & D'Souza, 1996). The data-collection in 
connection with attempted suicide is usually a problem and is therefore mostly obtained 
from individual reports. 
Data suggests an enormous increase in attempted suicide from 1960 onwards. The 
figures are 200/year/100 000 population for males and 350/year/100 000 populations for 
females in the USA (Diekstra & Hawton, 1987). Approximately two thirds of these 
statistics apply to people under the age of30 years. Diekstra and Hawton go on to say that 
according to results of three sample surveys (two in the Netherlands and one in Great 
Britain) these figures make up less than one third of the total attempted suicides. 
Once an attempt has been made the likelihood of subsequent death by suicide 
increases. Approximately ten percent of people with previous unsuccessful attempts 
eventually do commit suicide (Diekstra & Hawton, 1987). Data thus reveals that the 
phenomenon of suicidal behaviour has assumed the proportions of a major health problem 
in many countries. The burden on medical services of caring for suicide attempters is 
obviously of growing concern to medical and mental health professionals (Latha et al., 
1996). 
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(ii) Age and suicidal behaviour 
Shneidman (1989) states that suicide rates gradually rise during adolescence, increase 
sharply in early adulthood, and parallel advancing the age of75 to 84 years. Vaillant and 
Blumenthal (1989) report that over the past 20 years the percentage of deaths due to 
suicide in the United States of America by persons between 15 and 25 years of age has 
increased, while the percentage oftotal suicides by persons over 44 years of age decreased. 
In their epidemiological report Rosenberg, Smith and Davidson (1987) point out that from 
1950 to 1980 suicide rates for white males aged 15 to 19 increased by 305 %while the rate 
among 20 to 24 year old males increased by 196 %. Diekstra and Hawton (1987) also 
report that suicide by adolescents amounts to about a fifth of all suicides committed yearly 
in the Western World, while 60 percent of suicide attempts are also made by persons 
younger than 35 years (Latha et al., 1996). There is thus a shift in suicides where it is now 
committed at an earlier stage than before. 
Kalafat and Elias (1995, p.124) summarize a few disturbing characteristics of youth 
suicides as found by researchers in the last twenty years: 
Harkavay, Friedman, Asnis, Boeck and DiFiore; Ritter; as well as Smith and 
Crawford (in Kalafat & Elias, 1995) found that an average of 10% of adolescents 
in the USA has made a suicide attempt. 
Harkavay-Friedman et al.; Kosky, Silbum and Zubith; as well as Shaffer, Bacon, 
Fisher and Garland (in Kalafat & Elias, 1995) discovered that no clinical or 
demographic data exists which distinguishes attempters from completers. 
Kleiner (in Kalafat & Elias, 1995) points out that suicide attempts can produce 
serious injuries such as brain damage or paralysis. 
The senousness of the attempt does not reliably distinguish those who 
subsequently complete suicide (Kalafat & Elias, 1995}. 
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Brent, Perper, Kolko and Goldstein; Shafii, Whittinghill, Dolen, Parson, Derrick 
and Carrington; as well as Spirito, Overholzer, Ashworth, Morgan and Benedict-
Drew (in Kalafat & Elias, 1995) found that suicidal adolescents most often reveal 
their thoughts and feelings to peers. 
The phenomenon of youth suicide is a troubling one to most of us. Although 
documentation of child suicidal behaviour date back to the tum of the century, many still 
find it hard to believe that children as young as five or six can v.ish to die, and that some 
on them actually do commit suicide (Orbach, 1988). There are similarities, but also very 
distinct differences in patterns between adult and child suicide. 
(iii) Gender and suicidal behaviour 
Suicide rates have been shown to be higher for men than they are for women. The 
fluctuation of suicide rates over time in males is also greater wb.en compared to females 
(Blumenthal, 1990). There is however an increase in female suicidal behaviour over the 
last 20 years which Diekstra and Hawton (1987) relate to the phenomenon of attempted 
suicide. Schmidtke (1997) reports that the average male suicide rate in Europe is 
27,9/year/100 000 population and for females 8,9/year/100 000 population. 
Of all that is known about the phenomenon of suicide, few things are as clear as the 
fact that men and women differ in their suicidal behaviour. It seems clear that men 
complete suicide much more frequently than women do, while women make the majority 
of nonfatal suicide attempts. These differences do not appear to be related to differences in 
choice of method used to commit suicide. Even when women use the same method as 
men they still do not succeed as often as men do (Lester, 1997a). 
(iv) Income and suicidal behaviour (the socioeconomic hypothesis) 
In a macro comparison among different nations, Lester (Ferrada-Noli, 1997) found a 
positive correlation between gross national product and suicide rate. Demographic areas 
(with distinct socioeconomic constellations) within a country, however, may have suicide 
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rates quite divergent from the average of that particular nation. Despite the fact that many 
studies show a covariation of certain primarily negative sociodemographic or 
socioeconomic conditions with at least attempted suicide, simple sociodemographic 
explanations (e.g., different unemployment rates, different participation of women in the 
labour force, and social security systems) also do not explain the variations in European 
suicide and suicide attempt rates (Schmidtke, 1997). 
(v) Suicidal behaviour and culture 
Official death rates from suicide vary considerably between countries. The range 
varies from 3 to 45/year/100 000 population (Diekstra & Moritz, 1987). Some subgroups 
have particularly serious suicide problems that differ from those found in the general 
population. Although Lester (1997a) mentions young Americans as a group for whom 
suicide is a leading cause of death, Martin, Rozanes, Pearce and Allison (1995) cite 
Australia as the country with the highest suicide rate amongst youths in the industrialized 
world at 16,4/year/100 000 population. 
Suicide rates amongst European countries differ widely. Also within countries, some 
regions or states, like the former Yugoslavia, Hungary or Germany, often have 
significantly varying suicide rates (Schmidtke, 1997). Lester (1997a) reports that the 
suicide rate in the United States of America has remained remarkably constant over the last 
twenty years at mostly around 12/year/100 000 population. He cites Norway as a country 
that had a dramatic increase in their suicide rate of 6,5 to 16,8/year/100 000 population. 
The United Kingdom and Wales are countries that have dramatically decreased their rates 
from 12,1 to 7,4/year/100 000 population. The suicide rate of Sweden has historically 
been known as high, contributing to the common belief that Swedes are a suicide-prone 
nation (Ferrada-Noli, 1997). However, when cross-sectional, cross-cultural studies were 
performed there emerged the fact that Swedes were actually underrepresented in these 
studies. Although there is also a widely held belief that suicide is extremely common in 
Japan, it is not unusually high compared to other nations. This myth is probably due to the 
overemphasis of hara-kiri, kamikazi pilots, and suicides of well-known Japanese novelists 
(Takahashi, 1997). Qualitative analysis of many of the epidemiological studies reveals 
66 
more gross simplifications, emphasizing that death by suicide is a very individualistic and 
complex human behaviour not easily predicted. 
Lester (1997b) emphasizes the strong influence of acculturation upon the individual 
in his study on the suicide patterns of immigrants to the USA Studies show that suicide 
rates in native countries covary with differences of the same cultural groups in other 
countries (Lester, 1972; Sainsbury & Barraclough, 1968; Schmidtke, 1997}. Although this 
is the case Lester (1997b) still shows with his study that culture conflict and acculturation 
plays a role and affects the rate, meaning of: and circumstances of suicidal behaviour. He 
says, however, that acculturation does not lead in a direct linear way to an increased 
incidence of suicide. Takahashi (1997) agrees with Lester and states that numerous papers 
have focused on culture and suicide to such an extent that they have over-emphasized 
cultural differences and in this way increased the risk of increasing prejudice toward such 
cultures. He goes on to say that most cases of suicide reflect complex human factors that 
are found universally among cultures. Despite the fact that some cultural differences in 
suicide admittedly exist in different societies and that these are important, they cannot 
explain every aspect of suicide. Similarly, the hypotheses with regard to ethnic differences 
in suicidal behaviour are numerous, ranging from biological to nutrition and attitude 
factors, they do, however, not provide sufficient enough explanation (Schmidtke, 1997}. 
The reliability and validity of death certificates as a means of reporting has been 
raised by a few (Sainsbury, 1983; Schmidtke, 1997). European countries differ widely 
with regard to their death certification procedures, ranging from a coroner system in the 
United Kingdom, to the possibility that any general practitioner can sign a death certificate 
in Germany. The rate of autopsies also varies greatly, with high rates in Austria and very 
low rates in Germany (Schmidtke, 1997). The quality and reliability of official mortality 
reporting varies tremendously and comparison and interpretation of these figures must 
therefore be made very carefully. 
Despite the fact that differences in suicidal behaviour and suicide rates seem to exist 
between various subgroups of the human race, no hypothesis can fully explain these 
differences. Schmidtke (1997) states that to date, the most convincing hypotheses are 
those based on different attitudes toward suicidal behaviour. 
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5.2.3 Conclusion 
A large number of descriptive concepts and definitions have been used to try and 
simplify the complexities inherent in the social situation of human behaviour. This has 
been done to find the "true" underlying reality. Shorthand ways to describe particular 
types of behaviour has through a process of reification changed into semi-concrete entities 
with fixed characteristics. Hypothetical constructs originally used to describe behaviour 
were more and more us~d to explain that which they were intended to describe (Fourie, 
1996). 
The usual procedure in sociology has also for a long time been to assume that the 
definitions of suicide are non-problematic and then to analyze the official statistics to 
invent preventative strategies (Lester, 1997 a). This represents a realist or conventional 
scientific way of viewing human behaviour. Definitions intended to describe suicidal 
behaviour is seen as explanations and used accordingly. Various theories of suicide have 
seen the light in this manner. When one realizes the complexities inherent in defining 
suicide as well as grasps the implications of the relativity of the meaning of suicide, it 
becomes obvious that to take unknown but assumed definitions of officials and the 
statistics accompanying that regardless of context, to test sociological or any theory of 
suicide, has serious flaws. Realizing the often-deliberate attempts to conceal suicidal death 
make it an even more pointless endeavor. Douglas's (Lester, 1997a) solution to this 
dilemma is to get away from a position where research relies on official data, or abstract 
deJ;initions of suicide which developed from this data, to a position where the situated 
meanings of suicide becomes significant. Smart (1980) suggests that the definitions used 
in individual research projects therefore be accepted at face value. 
It would be suggested that a constructivist epistemology makes the utilization of 
research findings easier and can in that way circumvent some of the problems traditionally 
ascribed to ''the supposed research/practice gap" (Fourie, 1996, p. 7). The way we think 
about science and human functioning influences what we see and how applicable it is to 
human dilemmas we face. From a constructivist point of view psychological problems are 
not seen as semi-concrete entities existing within the person exhibiting problematic 
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behaviour, but as social constructions in language which can not only be constructed, but 
deconstructed as well (Fourie, 1996). Definitions of suicidal behaviour should thus be 
taken at face value, in that they are co-constructions in language and not something "real" 
out there. 
Qualitative research has been accepted by the scientific community as a viable way to 
explore and understand social phenomena for a while now, and characteristics of such a 
paradigm and its research has been presented (Atkinson & Heath, 1987; Cook & 
Reichardt, 1979; Hoshnland, 1989; Linc.oln & Guba, 1985; Moon, Dillon & Sprenkle, 
1990). It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to present all of it here. The writer wishes 
to focus on the second-order concepts of"ontology ofthe observer", ''participation ofthe 
observer" and an "ethic of participation" as proposed by Atkinson and Heath (1987) and 
Atkinson, Heath and Chenail ( 1991) to inform research on suicidal behaviour. 
5.3 Implications of a Second-order Perspective for Research 
5.3 .1 Introduction 
The conventional scientific paradigm assumes that a real social world exists 
independently of our observing of it and that this independently existing world is singular, 
stable, and predictable. It further assumes that if we apply the correct methods, we can 
have increasingly accurate views of what "really" happens in the world. From such a 
realist perspective it is believed that research can aid in discovering reality, while from a 
constructivist perspective it is believed that research findings are created by the way and 
circumstances in which the research is conducted (Fourie, 1996). Although the new 
research paradigm has a fundamentally different perspective from which social phenomena 
is viewed, a survey ofthe field of qualitative research revealed that some assumptions have 
not changed (Atkinson et al., 1991). This is the case especially with regards to the 
legitimization of qualitative research findings. 
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5.3.2 The Legitimization of Knowledge 
Like conventional researchers some qualitative researchers maintain that the use of 
specific, systematic methods of data collecting and recording make the insights of some 
qualitative researchers more valid and therefore more trustworthy. Atkinson et al ( 1991) 
believe that assumptions like these are still rooted in positivist conceptions about the nature 
of knowledge. The fact that one set of resuhs is seen as more trustworthy than the other, 
reflects a way of thinking rather than the true reality (Fourie, 1996). This judgment is 
usually also made regardless of the context in which such research was done. 
Atkinson et al. (1991) go on to say that ~di.vi_~ual researchers cannot establish the 
trustworthiness of their explanations, but that they require the judgment of an entire 
community of observers. Kuhn's ideas are very applicable to this endeavor. Kuhn 
(Atkinson & Heath, 1987) states that theory choice is an open process in which general 
criteria are applied uniquely by individual scientists in different situations. How this is 
done will therefore depend on the person's specific history, values, and life situation. 
Establishing the trustworthiness of research therefore becomes the job of those consuming 
the research and not the social science researchers. ''In the absence of certainty, 
knowledge is an ethical matter, one in which the judgment of each stakeholder must count" 
(Atkinson et al., 1991, p.163). 
An ethical stance of participation is therefore suggested where a researcher realizes 
and explains his/her position in the research process. This is also in accordance with a 
constructivist stance where it is realized that the act of observation influences the 
behaviour. This makes it easier for readers of the work to understand and get to their own 
interpretations of the research, something that is necessary when the trustworthiness needs 
to be established by a community of observers. These ideas will be elaborated on in the 
next section. 
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5.3.3 An Ethic ofParticipation 
It is clear that the social sciences are experiencing a shift "from a monological 
paradigm where the observer is not allowed to enter his/her descriptions, to a dialogical 
paradigm where descriptions reveal the nature of the observer" (Keeney & Morris, 1985, 
p.549). Atkinson and Heath (1987) believe that we as researchers might also benefit from 
a situation where it is shown more clearly how we as researchers draw distinctions. 
''Research becomes a task of re-examining (i.e., re-searching) what one did to construct a · 
particular reality" (Keeney & Morris, 1985). Atkinson and Heath (1987) propose that a 
researcher's patterns of organizing experience should be open for scrutiny. In this way 
readers can decide for themselves the legitimacy of a specific way of organizing 
experience. This is also the reason why McDermott, Gospodinof and Aron (in Atkinson & 
Heath, 1987) propose ethnographic research methods to be the most useful for the 
constructivist researcher. It is presented in an open way that leaves the reader to decide 
whether a specific account is believable or not. 
Atkinson and Heath (1987) think that it is time to move research in a direction that 
encourages researchers and readers to experience the research process. They predict that 
the result will be that everyone realizes that no one individual is in a better position to 
pronounce legitimacy than another is. This could lead to a renewed sense of community. 
In a context where research is seen as a collaborative experience the goal of research 
changes to one of creating novel observational experiences from which new views about 
the social world can emerge. Research thus cease to aim at finding universal ''truths", but 
"enter the contextually messy arena of clinical work" (Fourie, 1996, p.18). A shift in focus 
on research is thus foreseen. Research becomes the "making sense" of a total 
circumstance, including contextual elements and not the finding of uncontaminated 
''truths" (Fourie, 1996). As Moon et al. (1990) have pointed out, most of the major 
insights and theoretical models used in the field of family therapy have been generated 
through informal, exploratory, qualitative research. 
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5.3.4 Moral Issues and New Paradigm Research 
Marriage and family therapists have especially struggled over how to deal with moral 
and ethical issues, personal values, and individual beliefs as they enter the therapy and 
research process. The struggle's history started in the 1970s and early 1980s, when the 
dominant proposition was for ''value free" research and therapy (Volker, 1996). Neutrality 
was considered an important concept of several family therapy approaches as well (Haley, 
1978; Selvini-Palazzoli, Boscolo, Cecchin & Prata, 1980). Examining predominant 
metaphors used by family therapists Stein, in 1983 and later Doherty and Boss, in 1991 (in 
Volker, 1996), however, did not find neutrality. Stein therefore argued that unless 
therapists examined their own values they would continue to resocialize families to the 
dominant culture of the time. Doherty and Boss (in Volker, 1996) concluded that what 
was necessary now was to move on from an agreement at the theoretical level about value 
positions to self-examination and dialogue which would examine our values. 
It almost seems as if the new research paradigm is especially suited to apply to ethical 
and moral issues. This might be the case because a constructivist as opposed to a realist 
ontology is much closer to the clinical circumstance and is therefore more likely to provide 
clinicians with usable information (Fourie, 1996). By re-examining what one did to 
construct a specific reality could just as well include examining your own values in a 
dialogical way. Maturana (1988) states that the development of ethical dilemmas are 
inevitable if we choose a dialectic approach and become interested in the conversation 
between structure and organization, change and stability, order and chaos, subsystem and 
ecosystem It is also suggested that to examine ethical and moral dilemmas in a dialogical 
way by including the therapist's values seems to be the best answer for a novel 
observational experience that can broaden our understanding of suicidal behaviour. 
5.3.5 A Proposal: Public Discussion ofProfessional Values 
Volker (1996) presents a model to initiate the process of self-examination and public 
discussion of professional values. This model provides a dynamic, process-oriented 
framework for family therapists to reflect on their professional conduct in relation to their 
clients regarding the beliefs and preferences both hold on an evaluative, existential, and 
72 
affective level of the counseling process. This model is presented here because it 
represents: 
a starting point for professional dialogue around suicide and in that way involves 
the professional personally in the research process 
a vehicle to bring the researcher's values into the open 
an example of a qualitative approach which will provide "news of difference" and 
hopefully a new understanding of suicidal behaviour 
a dialectic process involving interaction between the client and the therapist 
an ecosystemic awareness of the ecological environment which removes the focus 
from the individual exhibiting suicidal behaviour 
a view where the plurality of contexts of knowledge is acknowledged 
Suicide is an issue that commonly generates value clashes within the microsystem of 
the therapist, within the microsystem of the family, and also within the mesosystem when 
these two micro systems meet in the therapy process (Volker, 1996). Each microsystem is 
also structurally coupled and part of larger exo- and macrosystems that inform and are 
being informed by the particular individual. Suicide will be discussed against the four 
values of responsibility, integrity, freedom of choice, and empowerment. These four 
values are part of the six mentioned by Volker and are selected arbitrarily and subjectively. 
The discussion is also subjective and only represents the writer's understanding of these 
values, how it informs and is being informed by systems it might be a part of: and how it 
impacts on the therapeutic system This exercise must be seen as an example of how 
impasses in therapy might be used to generate discussion around personal values and how 
it influences therapy. It can thus be used to get to an understanding of meanings around 
these values and how it can affect therapy. These discussions can take place in any system 
a therapist sees it fit to take place in and can represent higher orders of mind. 
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5.3.6 An Example: Exploration of Individual Values and how it can Impact Therapy 
with Suicidal Individuals 
(a) Responsibility 
Responsibility on the individual level of developing therapists means to care about 
themselves, to take into account their personal limitations and further their personal growth 
and to take into account their personal lives (Krasner & Houts, 1984). On the professional 
level the responsibility may include (a) membership in professional organizations; (b) 
compliance with the code of ethics; (c) ongoing supervision and education; (d) awareness 
of their professional limitations; and (e) understanding of the societal contexts present. 
Macintyre (in Volker, 1996) states that some see responsibility as a political quality that 
dialectically bridges the gap between the individual level ofpersonal development and the 
level of professional ethics. As responsibility is a shared endeavor in the therapy process, 
the question becomes who is responsible for what. Co-responsibility therefore includes (a) 
family members ultimately responsible for their own well being; (b) therapist responsible 
for structuring the treatment process, methods and professional attitudes; (c) both sharing 
responsibility for defining the goals of the counselling process. 
When a therapist becomes involved in therapy with suicidal behaviour a few values 
clashes can be envisioned. On the individual level, therapists may find themselves in a 
clash between their personal and professional value system and the legal obligation they 
have as mental health professionals. More will be said on the legal obligations of therapist 
towards clients with the discussion on suicide and ethics in Chapter 6. A therapist may 
hold the belief that clients have the ultimate responsibility for their lives, where the right to 
commit suicide is accepted. This attitude clashes with the legal obligations to have clients 
committed to treatment if they are in imminent danger of harming themselves (Volker, 
1994). The value where clients are ultimately responsible for their own lives coupled with 
the legal obligation to intervene and take over that responsibility when the therapist sees 
fit, creates a bind, illusion and almost impossible expectations for all involved. These 
expectations may hinder the therapy process and is thus necessary to explore in discussion. 
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(b) Integrity 
Therapists maintain integrity on the individual level by protecting themselves from 
intrusions of personal boundaries. Nurturing confidence and self-esteem, and standing up 
for their rights that are compatible with their personal values and beliefs also secure 
integrity according to Volker (1994). On the professional level therapists protect their 
integrity by preventing other professionals or clients physically and emotionally harming 
them. In the therapy process one can imagine that in order to protect the clients and 
therapist's integrity it is 'necessary for both to define clear boundaries between them, by 
being committed to creating a context where respect, self-confidence and assertiveness is 
encouraged in both. 
When legally obligated to intervene when serious suicidal behaviour is present in 
therapy, the client's integrity is violated. The therapist has to pretend that they know better 
than their client does when considering what is best for the client's well being. 
(c) Freedom of choice 
Freedom of choice on a personal level implies that a therapist or client will feel that 
he/she can do whatever he/she chooses and not to feel enslaved unless chosen to be. This 
is seen as an essential part of personal being, and enables a person to be responsive to 
others (Volker, 1994). On the professionalleve~ freedom of choice can be seen to reflect 
the dialectical character between the individual values and professional ethics. A therapist 
can therefore choose to select or exclude clients if there is an apparent value clash, as long 
as the ethical and legal guidelines of the profession is followed. The concept of freedom of 
choice helps to balance clients' personal well being and their value system with the 
therapist's (Volker, 1994). Either party in the therapy process can therefore choose to 
disengage from the therapy when an obvious value clash is eminent. 
When a therapist is legally obliged to intervene coercively, the client's freedom to 
choose and in that way be part of the therapy process, is violated. Aware of this 
contradiction in value, some clients can be understood to engage in therapy for exactly this 
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reason: to not exercise their freedom of choice. Knowing that the therapist will be obliged 
to act in a way that goes against respecting the client's freedom of choice. 
(d) Empowerment 
Strategies and information that strengthen the way we feel about ourselves and others 
can be seen to be empowering. Professionally therapists engage in various activities like 
supervision, consuhation and continuing education to enhance professional growth and 
feelings of empowerment. Acknowledging powerlessness from the client as well as the 
therapist can also be seen as empowering. This acknowledgement also protects both from 
getting trapped in omnipotent fantasies and inappropriate rescue efforts (Volker, 1994 ). 
The decision to coerce a suicidal client into methods that prevent suicidal behaviour 
from occurring can lead to clients feeling more powerless than before they entered the 
therapy process. 
(e) Conclusion 
Volker (1994) believes that a suicidal client should have the right to commit suicide 
when, in accordance with the therapist's personal and professional value system, the 
suicidal client is able to make a conscious decision '"ithin the basic values mentioned. He, 
however, almost immediately mentions that there are limitations to this right and cites 
psychotic episodes or any behaviour that could be regarded as a sign of inability ''to take 
on the responsibility for his or her (well-) being" (Volker, 1994, p.203) as indicative of the 
therapist having to take control! The writer does not propose that this model be used to 
decide what and how therapeutic action be taken when working with suicidal patients, but 
proposes like Volker that this model be used to generate a process of self-examination of 
professional values to open it up for public discussion. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter it became clear why research on suicidal behaviour is sometimes 
counterproductive and is seen by some as just another way to "conceptually deny death". 
Ahhough a lot has been learned about suicidal behaviour in the conventional scientific 
paradigm, not much new meaning has come to light around individual suicidal behaviour. 
Some characteristics have been isolated and have helped immensely in generating various 
suicide prevention programs throughout the world. No direct causes of suicidal behaviour 
has however been found which could be worked at directly to make the prevention of 
suicide more effective. 
The new research paradigm has provided interesting openings for research in suicidal 
behaviour. With its emphasis on the inclusion of a community of observers to judge the 
legitimacy of knowledge as well as the subsequent dialogical approach to assist in this 
process, the new research paradigm has provided an excellent tool in examining a highly 
ethical and moral issue like suicidal behaviour. The new research paradigm has also 
drawn our attention to the fact that how we look at research data ultimately determines the 
utility of it clinically. Demographic data as well as various efforts at defining suicidal 
behaviour is therefore not pointless if it is viewed contextually. When the aim of research 
on suicide, however, remains focused on discovering the ''truth" about suicidal behaviour 
to ultimately prevent it from occurring, the same and more methodological difficulties can 
be expected. 
In the next chapter the issue of ethics and how it affects and impacts on being in 
therapy with suicidal individuals will be dealt with. 
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CHAPTER6 
ETHICS AND SUICIDAL BEHAVIOUR 
6.1 Introduction 
According to Maddock (in Volker, 1994) "ethics" refers to the process of reflecting 
on human conduct in order to achieve clarity with regard to the value aspects of human 
experience. The de:finllig characteristic of therapy consistent with the assumptions of 
social constructivism and a second-order approach is its emphasis on ethics (Becvar & 
Becvar, 1996). We will see, however, that the concept of ethics has a slightly different 
emphasis when viewed from a second-order perspective. 
In this chapter the concept of ethics as it relates to suicidal behaviour will be 
discussed. The dominant image of suicide today as well as its subsequent emphasis on 
prevention as a way of treatment will be presented. The issues of professional liability, 
responsibility, and the right to suicide will be discussed, before the second-order 
perspective of an ethic of participation will be introduced. With this perspective it will be 
shown that a whole new set of ethical issues emerges, ethical dilemmas which are 
inevitable if we choose a dialectic approach (Maturana, 1988). 
6.2 Towards an Understanding of the Current Perception of Suicide 
A dramatic change in the perception of suicide occurred in roughly the year 1800. 
Before that time, suicide was considered to be both a sin and a crime for which the actor 
was responsible ( Szasz, 1986). Since then suicide has increasingly been regarded as a 
manifestation of madness for which the actor is not responsible (Fedden, 1938). Long 
before suicide was decriminalized, the responsibility of suicidees for their deeds was 
annulled by declaring them, posthumously, non compos mentis. ''Although Blackstone 
foresaw and forewarned against such use of the idea of insanity, it is precisely the elastic 
and strategic character of the concept that makes mental illness so attractive to the modem 
mind" (Szasz, 1989, p.439). 
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Since that time several highly rational and elaborate theories have been developed to 
convince us that the source of suicidal behaviour is to be found in either the psychologica~ 
biological or genetic make-up of an individual or the relationships between the individual 
and his/her social environment. This is known as the traditional view of suicide, called 
"determinist", where suicidal behaviour is seen as caused by factors beyond the 
individual's control (Battin, 1982). Szasz (1989, p.440) states that the ')>sychiatric 
matrimony" between mental illness and suicide is connected strongly by a legal tradition 
of distinguishing between sane and insane suicides. This tradition is supported by a 
perspective viewing suicide as a "symptom" of mental illness, and mental illness as a 
"cause" of suicide. To a large extent, our current laws and mental health system are based 
on this determinist view. The patient's decision to commit suicide is not rational or 
autonomous and the patient is not responsible and is therefore not faced with a moral 
decision. It is therefore easy to see why society believes that it has a moral obligation to 
intervene. This obligation is directed to the health professional who, usually very 
willingly, accepts the task of saving the patient, often not realizing the ethical implications 
(Amchin, Wettstein & Roth, 1990). 
Szasz (1986) believes that the modern "scientific"/determinist vtew of suicide 
represents a secularized version of the Judeo-Christian tradition concerning the 
unacceptability of the act. Suicide as self-murder originates from the idea in which taking 
one's life is a most grievous offense against God. This perspective is therefore thought to 
prohibit suicide. Although this view of suicide is prevalent in society today, the validity of 
it has been debated on several grounds. Persuasive arguments can be advanced so that this 
tradition does not absolutely prohibit suicide. There are alternative theological traditions 
that permit suicide, such as release of the so~ self-sacrifice, avoidance of sin, and 
attainment of a higher spiritual state (Battin, 1982). Social arguments also support both 
sides of the suicide issue. Suicide hurts society by harming family and friends, depriving 
society ofthat person's contribution, and undermining society's system of laws. Suicide 
might also benefit society when it is perceived as martyrdom or as a way of removing 
social burdens (Amchin et al., 1990). 
The dominant image of suicide today, though, is as a mental abnormality or illness or 
as a symptom of such a condition. People prefer to explain suicide by viewing it 
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"scientifically", creating an image of it as a combination of sin, sickness, crime, 
irrationality, incompetence, and insanity. Szasz (1986, p.807) states that the result of this 
is a "stubborn unwillingness to view suicide as we view other morally freighted acts- like 
abortion or divorce - as good or bad, desirable or undesirable, depending on the 
circumstances in which they occur and the criteria by which they are judged". 
6.3 Preventing Suicide 
Although important arguments challenge the presumption of preventing suicide in all 
cases, suicide is still viewed as an undesirable act. People will therefore insist on holding 
someone or something responsible for it ( Szasz, 1989 ). Once the clinician has assumed the 
professional responsibility for treating a patient, society imposes both a moral and a legal 
obligation on the clinician to act responsibly in treating that patient (Amchin et al, 1990). 
Amchin et al. (1990) conclude their discussion by emphasizing that the ethical issues 
presented by suicidal behaviour are complex and require at least two levels of analysis. 
One such level addresses the moral right of the client to act. Society currently avoids this 
issue by considering a suicidal patient incapable of a moral choice because the patient 
suffers form a mental disorder. The other level of analysis addresses the moral right and 
professional obligation of the clinician. 
6.4 Professionalliability 
''Failure to prevent suicide is now one of the leading reasons for successful 
malpractice suits against mental health professionals and institutions" (Szasz, 1986, p.806). 
Until the 1970's, lawsuits against the mental health profession of psychology were 
relatively few. Simon & Sadoff (in Vesper, 1996) states that recently there has been an 
increase in litigation against therapists. According to the American Psychological 
Association's Insurance Trust, suicide of a client is the sixth most common category for a 
claim but second in the total cost to the insurance carrier. There is speculation that many 
of the other claims may subsume damage claims for suicide and self-harm (Vesper, 1996). 
This points to the fact that all mental health practitioners run the risk of being accused of 
professional negligence for failing to prevent a client's suicide. 
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The main reason mental health professionals and institutions are found liable for a 
client's suicide is because they assume the duty and responsibility of preventing suicide. 
Szasz (1986) says that although they sometimes complain about the burden this duty 
entails, they clearly enjoy the extra power and prestige that go along with it. He believes 
that if these professionals did not want to engage in coercive suicide prevention, they could 
say so and refuse to participate in such work When they choose, though, ethical principles 
can be used to guide their therapy. 
The three key ethical principles of autonomy, nonmaleficence, and beneficence seem 
to have the greatest impact on decisions related to suicidal behavior. They speak directly 
to the difficult issues of independence of personal choice, defining harm, causing harm, 
and benefiting another person (Albright & Hazier, 1995). The concept of beneficence 
refers to any action that prevents harm or removes harmful conditions and positively 
benefits a client, while the concept of nonmaleficence refers to the therapist's duty to "do 
no harm" (Albright & Hazier, 1995). The principle of autonomy refers to the integrity of 
clients as well as the recognition oftheir need for freedom of choice. 
Although no general principle in any of the ethical codes obviously advocates 
preventing suicide, some of the principles can be interpreted in that way. Abstracts of the 
ethical code of (1) the American Psychological Association (APA) and (2) the 
Psychological Society of South Africa (PsySSA) will be presented. It will firstly be shown 
that some of these principles can be interpreted to emphasize taking responsibility for 
preventing suicide and therefore of honoring the principles of nonmaleficence and 
benificence. It will secondly be shown that some of the principles can be interpreted to 
emphasize not preventing suicide and, therefore, honoring the principle of autonomy. 
Table 6.1 
Ethical Principles from APA and PsySSA which sunnort the Ethical Concsmts of 
Nonmaleficence and Benificence 
The American PRINCIPLE C: Psychologists uphold professional standards of 
Psychological PROFESSIONAL conduct, clarify their professional roles and 
Association's AND SCIENTIFIC obligations, accept appropriate responsibility for 
RESPONSIBILITY 
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(APA's) Ethical 
Principles of 
Psychologists 
and Code of 
Conduct 
The American PRINCIPLE E: 
Psychological 
Association's 
(APA's) Ethical 
Principles of 
Psychologists 
and Code of 
Conduct 
CONCERN 
OTHERS' 
WELFARE 
The American PRINCIPLE F: 
Psychological SOCIAL 
their behavior, and adapt their methods to the 
needs of different populations. Psychologists 
consuh with, refer to, or cooperate with other 
professionals and institutions to the extent 
needed to serve the best interests of their 
patients, clients, or other recipients of their 
services. 
Psychologists seek to contribute to the welfare of 
FOR those with whom they interact professionally. ln 
their professional actions, psychologists weigh 
the welfare and rights of their patients or clients, 
students, supemsees, human research 
participants, and other affected persons, and the 
welfare of animal subjects ofre- search: 
Association's RESPONSIDILITY 
Psychologists are aware of their professional 
and scientific responsibilities to the community 
and the society in which they work and live. 
They apply and make public their knowledge of 
psychology in order to contribute to human 
welfare. 
(APA's) Ethical 
Principles of 
Psychologists 
and Code of 
Conduct 
Psychological PRINCIPLE 1: 
Society of South 
Afiica (PsySSA) PROFESSIONAL 
- Ethical Code RESPONSIDILITY 
for Psychologists 
As practitioners, psychologists have the 
responsibility to serve the welfare and best 
interests of the people and groups with whom 
they work. They have a dual responsibility: to 
their clients and to the broader society in which 
they work 
Phrases like: to serve the best interests of their clients; seek to contribute to the 
welfare of those with whom they interact; professional and scientific responsibilities to the 
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community and the society; the responsibility to serve the welfare and best interests are all 
examples that manifests the ethical principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence. 
Table 6.2 
Ethical Principles from AP A and PsySSA which support the Ethical Concept or Autonomy 
The American PRINCIPLED: Psychologists accord appropriate respect to the 
Psychological RESPECT FOR fundamental rights, dignity, and worth of all 
Association's PEOPLE'S RIGHTS people. They respect the rights of individuals to 
AND DIGNITY 
(APA's) -
Ethical 
Principles of 
Psychologists 
and Code of 
Conduct 
Psychological 
Society of South 
PRINCIPLE 3: 
Africa (PsySSA) MORAL 
- Ethical Code LEGAL 
for Psychologists STANDARDS 
Psychological PRINCIPLE 5: 
Society of South 
Africa (PsySSA) INFROMED 
- Ethical Code CONSENT 
for Psychologists 
Psychological 
Society of South 
PRINCIPLE 6: 
Africa (PsySSA) WELFARE 
- Ethical Code CLIENT 
for Psychologists 
privacy, confidentiality, self-determination, and 
autonomy, mindful that legal and other 
obligations may lead to inconsistency and 
conflict with the exercise of these rights. 
Psychologists avoid any action that will violate 
or diminish the legal and civil rights of clients or 
AND others who may be affected by their actions. 
Psychologists respect the autonomy of all people 
who may be affected by them in the exercise of 
their professional roles. They avoid the use of 
coercion in treatment and assessment or when 
involving others in research projects and, as far 
as possible, encourage joint decision-making 
regarding procedures to be adopted. 
Psychologists respect the integrity and protect 
the welfare of the people and groups with whom 
OF they work. 
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Phrases like: respect the rights of individuals to pnvacy, confidentiality, self-
determination, and autonomy; avoid any action that will violate or diminish the legal and 
civil rights of clients; respect the autonomy of all people as well as respect the integrity, 
manifest the principle of autonomy. 
Under ideal circumstances adherence to all these principles is not only desirable but 
also possible. Given the complexity of clinical phenomena, like suicidal behaviour, 
conflicts between these principles frequently occur, ethical dilemmas therefore arise. 
When this happens therapists are advised to apply several principles and to consider the 
likely outcome of various courses of action (SA lnstitute for Clinical Psychologists). Good 
clinical practice requires recognition that none of these principles is absolute and that each 
can be overridden by another under certain circumstances (Rosenbluth, Kleinman & 
Lowry, 1995). The need for dynamic rather than rigid application of ethical principles is 
thus necessary for the successful management of the suicidal patient. 
Albright and Hazier (1995) say that therapists first have an obligation to respect the 
integrity of their clients and to recognize their need for freedom of choice. The principle 
of autonomy can thus mean that refusing a competent person's request for cessation of 
therapy, or cessation of life for that matter, could show disrespect for that person's 
deliberate choices. The judging of a person to be legally competent or not is a difficult 
process. ''The phenomena of ambivalence, fluctuating affect, depressed mood, 
disorganized cognition, and transference in suicidal clients are highly relevant to decisions 
that are both clinically and ethically appropriate" (Rosenbluth et al., 1995, p.920). 
The assumption is traditionally made that since persons normally value life, the wish 
to end it must first be considered evidence of incompetence on psychiatric grounds. Until 
proven otherwise the client's judgement is therefore considered distorted. Rosenbluth et 
al. (1995) advocate that the management of an acutely suicidal compared to a chronically 
suicidal client differs. Treatment of the acutely suicidal client entails the vigorous 
preservation of the suicidal person's life while the "underlying disorder" is treated. ln this 
case the principle of beneficence and nonmaleficence can be seen to take precedence over 
the principle of autonomy. Applying the same ethical reasoning to the management of 
chronically suicidal clients could be seen to be unnecessarily rigid and can prove to be 
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counterproductive. Rosenbluth et al (1995) stress that the treatment of these clients can be 
seen to have two objectives, namely to preserve the life of the vu1nerable person and to 
promote the growth of the individual to the maximum extent possible. Treating these 
clients as though they are acutely suicidal by arranging hospitalization to protect them and 
thus be motivated by therapeutic beneficence only, would overlook the other clinically 
important issue of autonomy. It is therefore needed to distinguish when which ethical 
principle be given primacy. 
Rosenbluth et al. (1995) warn that rigid adherence to the principle of autonomy 
would unnecessarily risk the lives of acutely suicidal clients. Rigid interpretation of the 
principle of beneficence and nonmaleficence "would unnecessarily risk consigning many 
chronically depressed clients to lives of dependency and chronic patienthood" (p.921). 
The successful management of the suicidal patient thus illustrates the need for fleXIole 
dynamic application of ethical principles. 
6.5 Responsibility for Suicide 
The term '1-esponsible" is used to describe a person's accountability for the conduct 
and welfare of another person or himself/herself Szasz (1989) goes on to say that 
responsibility is intertwined with two other concepts namely that of liberty and control 
Adults are moral agents endowed with free will. A person cannot be held responsible for 
something he/she does not control It follows, then, that anyone who assumes the task of 
preventing another person from committing suicide must assume the most far-reaching 
control over that person's capacity to act. It is no wonder then that most efforts at 
preventing suicide have an unmistakable coercive character however subtly put. Since it is 
virtually impossible to have so much control over a person as to prevent that person from 
committing suicide, and since "forcibly imposed interventions to prevent suicide deprive 
the patient of freedom, the use of psychiatric coercion to prevent suicide is not only 
impractica~ but also immoral" (Szasz, 1989, p.439). 
What then is the health professional's responsibility for in this regard? Szasz (1986) 
says that the most obvious answer to this question would probably be that the therapist's 
responsibility for his/her client is whatever the law and social custom say it is. He goes on 
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to say that it should, however, be more than that. The mental heahh professional's 
responsibility concerning the suicidal patient should be the same as any other heahh 
professional's concerning his/her competent aduh patient. If the person wants to or is 
willing to accept help for being suicidal, the heahh professional has a moral obligation to 
provide that. If the person on the other hand does not want such help and actively rejects 
it, then the heahh professional should leave such a person. It should therefore be the same 
as with any other competent adult client. 
The writer agrees with Szasz (1986), but would like to further. The therapist's 
responsibility should even be more than treating a suicidal person as any other competent 
aduh client, and in that way emphasize the right of every responsible aduh to consider and 
do suicide. It should also entail participation on the part of the therapist, something that 
will be elaborated on in section 6. 7. 
6.6 The Right to Suicide 
Several authors have written about the "right to suicide" and the idea of "rational 
suicide" under particular circumstances (Battin, 1982; Clements, Sider & Perlmutter, 1983; 
Humphry, 1987; Iqervik, 1984; Maris, 1982, 1983; Werth, 1992). These views argue that 
it is morally \\'Tong to stop someone from committing suicide. Szasz (1986) states that a 
person has a fundamental right to commit suicide. Beauchamp and Childress (1983) state 
that this right c-Omes from the increasing emphasis placed on the principle of autonomy. A 
legally competent individual has therefore the right to control his/her own life. This might 
also have developed from a libertarian philosophy where a competent individual has the 
right to do as he or she freely chooses provided others are not harmed Suicide might still 
not be seen as morally right, but this right to suicide would override other moral arguments 
about suicide. If the fundamental right to commit suicide is rec-Ognized under the 
determinist view, suicide would be permitted, and suicide prevention would become the 
exception. This approach will have significant implications for the mental health 
professional. 
Ahhough the clinician may treat the patient, he/she would not be empowered to 
prevent the suicide act. Szasz (1989) says that it does not mean that health professionals 
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may not assume specific moral or legal responsibilities concerning people deemed to be 
suicidal. They would, however, have no more responsibility for preventing other people's 
suicidal behaviour than any ordinary person has for preventing the lawful behaviour of 
total strangers. Taking refuge in the scientific determinist view, most practitioners, 
however, argue that suicidal behaviour by a mentally disordered patient represents a 
manifestation of the mental disorder, not the exercise of a fundamental right (Amchin et 
al., 1990). Szasz (1989, p.438) sees this attitude as ''typical of a medieval priest ... only his 
views on suicide are valid, only his policies for preventing suicide are moral 
(compassionate, humane, therapeutic)". 
Ahhough the typical case provided for a rational suicide is a person with a terminal 
illness (Siegel, 1982), the problem with this approach still lies with defining and 
identifying suicides that are truly rational. Am chin et al. ( 1990) also state that an 
understanding of the consequences of one's decision are needed to make a rational choice 
with regards to the continuation of life. If a m~tal health professional adheres to a view of 
psychiatric patients as those who do not have the ability to reason, then the idea of rational 
suicide will not apply to that category of people. In a study done by Werth and Liddle 
(1994) on psychotherapists' attitudes toward suicide it was found that 81 percent of the 
respondents believed in rational suicide. A majority of psychotherapists apparently believe 
that suicide is, in some cases acceptable and that the client's situation would to some extent 
dictate the amount of action taken to prevent suicide. 
6.7 An Ethic of Participation 
Psychological associations across the world develop guidelines to safeguard clients 
and uphold the highest standards of professional behaviour. It is essential that all 
practitioners be familiar with and follow such codes to the best oftheir ability. Becvar and 
Becvar (1996) state that the code of ethics published in August 1991 by the American 
Association for Marriage and Family Therapy (AAMFT) deals, like that of most other 
professional groups, primarily with pragmatic issues at the level of simple cybernetics. 
Suggestions of how this is done, were presented by Rosenbluth et al. (1995) and Albright 
and Hazier (1995) and were discussed in section 6.4. 
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An ethical and responsible stance from a second-order perspective can be seen not to 
stop at this point however, but are much more inclusive. This is the case because the 
nature of the concerns and the types of questions asked changes when viewed from this 
perspective. They will arise out of the same ecological awareness that allows us to 
punctuate relationship, recursion, and a constantly conjoined universe (Becvar & Becvar, 
1996). 
Ethical issues will, therefore, not only be centred around pragmatic questions dealing 
with the ascription to a specific ethical principle in a given situation, but with higher-order 
ones as well. Higher order issues involve the inclusion of the therapist and his/her being in 
society as well as an awareness of this ''being in society". When there is an understanding 
and awareness of yourself as always participating in the construction of a world of 
experience, you realize that what you perceive is drawn by how you behave, and how you 
behave follows from what you perceive (Keeney, 1982). A therapist's view of a symptom 
(e.g., suicidal behaviour) presupposes a partic~ar preference, intent, and ethical base. Any 
description a therapist chooses to indulge in would thus say more about him/herself than it 
says about what is being described. Being concerned with objectivity or subjectivity or 
(from a moral perspective) ''right" or ''wrong" should therefore rather be replaced by a 
concern with responsibility (Howe & Von Foerster, 1974). A responsible stance would be 
much more interested in an exploration of how the observer participates in what he/she is 
observing (Keeney, 1983a), something which an exploration of epistemology is part of 
Some theorists have mentioned areas which therapists should be aware of when 
considering an ethical stance of participation. 
The ethical imperative, acc.ording to Becvar and Becvar (1996), is ''to avoid 
pathologizing, avoid the implications that we have access to the truth, and avoid narrowing 
the range ofhealth to the point where there is little we do that is not illness" (p.118). If we 
apply this to the ethical view of dealing with suicidal behaviour, it could imply that we 
therefore avoid moralizing therapeutic behaviour. It could also imply that we avoid 
narrowing the range of therapeutic behaviour to the point were three ethical principles be 
used to determine if what we do is ethically ''right". The ''right" way of doing therapy can 
be seen to be just as objectionable an endeavor as finding the ''truth". Hoffman (1991) 
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stresses the need to be aware ofhidden power relations and says that it is usually obscured 
within the assumptions of our social discourse. 
We will always be part of a context that defines acceptable and unacceptable 
behaviour, because we live in a society that, of necessity, evolve appropriate rules of 
conduct. As perceivers and creators of systemic and cybernetic reality we should therefore 
realize and become aware that suicidal behaviour is defined as an ethical issue only 
because we choose to define it as such (Keeney, 1983). We should also realize that 
juggling ethical c.oncepts.in deciding how to therapeutically deal with suicidal behaviour 
are not the ''right" and "moral" way, but a way that makes sense in this day and age. It 
makes sense now, because it can be seen as an extension of the psychiatric paradigm, 
which means that it basically still represents a determinist view. Although an ethical 
emphasis therefore represents an inclusion of a larger context, that is, society's 
expectations and needs, it is still focused on finding the "real world". A search for ''truth" 
is replaced by a search for the ''right" way of doing therapy. We should also be aware that 
our responses to situations defined as problems have as much potential to maintain those 
problems as to solve them The very act of punctuating therapeutic behaviour as ethical or 
unethical can, in some people's eyes, add weight to rationales that keep certain practices 
going or not. It can therefore help ward off in-depth exploration of the phenomena, and in 
that way help to maintain the problematic behaviour. The punctuation of therapeutic 
behaviour should therefore not keep us from questioning it relentlessly as researchers. 
An ethic of participation differs from being ethical in the traditional way. An ethic of 
participation entails that you are not concerned with being "objective" or "subjective", 
''right" or ''wrong", "acceptable" or "'not acceptable", but that you are mvare. You are 
aware that when you choose whatever punctuation to define a situation, it will surely turn 
out to be that way, because we are part of constructing what we see. What you perceive is 
drawn by how you behave, and how you behave follows from what you perceive. 
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6.8 Conclusion 
In tbis chapter it was shown that the image of suicide as a sin and a crime for wbich 
the suicidal person took responsibility has through the years changed to one where suicide 
is seen as a manifestation of madness, a determinist view of suicide where the cause of 
suicide is beyond the individual's control Tbis view is founded in a Judeo-Christian 
tradition where the act of suicide is seen as unacceptable and must therefore be prohibited. 
From this image of suicide it is not surprising that most efforts at understanding suicide 
was based around efforts to prevent it from occurring in the first place. Since suicidal 
behaviour is seen as a manifestation of madness the suicidal individual is not seen as 
responsible for it. The moral right of an individual to commit suicide is therefore not 
analyzed in so much depth as the moral right and responsibility of the mental health 
professional, the one taking on, and on whose shoulders the burden fell. 
The etbical codes and principles guiding therapists in their dealings with suicidal 
individuals were described. It was stressed that the flexible and dynamic application of the 
principles of autonomy, beneficence and nonmaleficence is necessary for successful 
management of the suicidal individual. The right to commit suicide or rational suicide was 
debated on the grounds that it is morally wrong to stop someone from committing suicide. 
It was, however, stressed that identifying and defining the truly rational suicide still 
presented professionals with problems. 
An etbic of participation was lastly proposed where it became clear that finding the 
ethically ''right" way of doing therapy, although representing a more inclusive perspective, 
still has as its basis a Newtonian/Cartesian assumption of "truth" as existing "out there" 
and as attainable. It was shown that an etbic of participation as it is provided by a second-
order cybernetic perspective punctuates it very differently in the process. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 Theories of Suicidal Behaviour 
In Chapter 2 the Psychiatric paradigm has been described using the biological, 
psychoanalytical and behavioural/cognitive perspectives on suicidal behaviour. These 
perspectives can be seen to inform one another and is mostly used together in ''multi-
disciplinary" format. Suicidal individuals are seen through this approach as having a 
psychologica~ biological, cognitive or genetic make-up that predisposes them to exhibit 
suicidal behaviour. 
This view is a result of the influence of the Newtonian/Cartesian paradigm on 
medical thought. Through this approach the human body is regarded as a machine that can 
be analysed in terms of its parts and the health practitioner's role is seen as intervening, 
physically or chemically, to correct the malfunctioning of a specific mechanism Before 
De~~f1:~s, most healers have treated their patients within the context of their social and 
spiritual environment. With his strict division between mind and body, physicians were 
c-
led to concentrate on the body machine and to neglect the psychological, socia~ and 
environmental aspects of illness. Medical problems are mostly reduced to molecular 
phenomena with the aim of finding a mechanism that is central to the problem. In this way 
practitioners limit themselves to partial aspects of the phenomena they study (Capra, 
1982). 
In spite of great advances in medical science, we are still witnessing a profmmd crisis 
in the health care of suicidal behaviour. Explanations of why this could still be the case 
centre around the fact that ( 1) biology alone does not adequately explain, and can therefore 
never be used to control suicidal behaviour; (2) a_perceived hierarchy keeps medical 
practitioners as the decision-makers in the treatment of suicidal behaviour; (3) the 
realisation of the multi-dimensiona~ interpersonal characteristics of suicidal behaviour 
would entail a complete change in current medical practice; (4) society is still hesitant in 
dealing with any behaviour relating to death or taking responsibility for it. 
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In Chapter 3 it was shown that a broader focus which includes wider systems and 
related relationships around suicidal individuals provides a more in-depth understanding of 
the behaviour. Even though most realize this, there is still a tendency specifically in the 
social sciences to model concepts and theories after those of Newtonian physics. The 
basic error that the social sciences fall into is to divide the social fabric into fragments and 
,------·-~~··-o~,"- -••• -• ' 
not to realize and apply the fact that humans are multi-faceted beings. Identification of the 
"suicidal" family, or even in Durkheim's (1952) case the "suicidal" society, can be seen as 
an example of this. All in all, the sociological paradigm represents (1) a realisation that 
more and ·wider systems need to be considered to understand suicidal behaviour better and 
(2) a shift away from physical structures in their emphasis un values and meanings as 
constructions of the human mind. 
From a holistic perspective on health, suicidal behaviour can be seen as an 
organism's attempt to heal itself and achieve a new level of integration. Standard 
psychiatric and medical practice interferes with this process by suppressing the symptoms. 
Seeing ill health in the broad context of the human condition recognizes that suicidal 
behaviour can be understood only in relation to the whole network of interactions in which 
that person is embedded. 
7.2 Discussion 
No single theory provides answers to our current dilemma around suicidal behaviour. 
Treatment following from specific approaches does not achieve what it sets out to do, 
namely to prevent suicide from happening, simply because no single "cause" of suicidal 
behaviour exists. Attempts to rectify isolated, perceived "flaws" sometimes cause even 
more damage (Capra, 1982). The researcher proposes that these difficulties do not lie in 
the specific theories themselves, but in the way they are used. Medication is prescribed in 
order to control suicidal behaviour; psychoanalysis is attempted to rid the unconscious of 
conflict, cognitive therapy to alter niindsets; family therapy to open closed structures and 
introduce better ways of communication. All of the above is done to stop the suicidal 
behaviour from occurring and in that way it restrains the system from evolving in an 
idiosyncratic way true to the nature of autopoeitic systems. It also communicates a 
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"dissatisfaction" with some chosen factor connected to the suicidal behaviour. This 
perceived "dissatisfaction" is rooted in a paradigm which has as its aims to find absolute 
"truth" and to rectifY ''wrongs". It also assumes that if these ''wrongs" are removed or 
altered that suicidal behaviour will disappear. 
An interesting development is perceived when dealing with morally complex 
situations which, for example, suicidal behaviour presents us with. Finding "objective" 
truth about suicidal individuals and behaviour shares the limelight with and is sometimes 
replaced by finding the ethically ''right" way to act therapeutically. The traditional ethical 
way can be seen as adopting to a situation where the responsibility of controlling suicidal 
behaviour is progressively put on mental heahh practitioners as well as progressively 
assumed by them. Although such an approach emphasizes human values of the therapist it 
still originates from a Ne\\tonian paradigm fixed on viewing a dichotomous reality. 
Finding the ''right" way can be seen as just as objectionable as finding the ''truth". 
When theories are used to perceive ''truth'' and "falseness" or ''right" and '\uong", 
that is exactly what will be perceived. When we want to control suicidal behaviour with 
medication we will perceive it as either under wntrol or not. If we attempt to rid the 
unconscious of conflict, we \\ill either succeed or not. We will either alter cognitive 
mindsets or not. We will be able to open closed family systems or they will remain closed. 
With such a perspective of dichotomy we will always be confronted with a reality existing 
of''right" or ''wrong" responses. Not because they are necessarily "right" or ''wrong", but 
because we choose to punctuate our reality in that way. We will therefore need to deal 
with the fact that cases can be perceived as ''failures", to ourselves as well as those that we 
work with. This will be the case because we are primed to see the world as either 
achieving that which we hope to achieve, as informed by our theories, or not. 
It is no wonder then that when -viewed from this limiting perspective: 
Suicidal behaviour still presents as a huge public health issue which developed 
countries spend enormous amounts of money to research. 
The more demographics unconnected to C{)ntext are explore{}, the more worrying 
the picture of suicidal behaviour gets. 
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The more appeals are made to health professionals to provide understanding of and 
answers to the treatment of suicidal behaviour, the more these helping 
professionals feel pressurised to find ways of controlling and preventing suicidal 
behaviour rather than understanding it. The pressure from society to take 
responsibility, therefore, forces many heahh professionals to respond in a 
preventative first-order way. 
Suicidal behaviour and its therapeutic treatment has developed into an ethical issue, 
dedicated to give professionals guidelines to help with this inability to change the 
"status quo" of not being able to control suicidal behaviour. 
Not only will a comprehensive understanding of suicidal behaviour elude the 
clinician operating from such a paradigm, but such a therapist can feel restricted 
therapeutically. 
When suicidal behaviour is viewed from a higher-order or second-order cybernetic 
level, all of the above theories can be used to understand suicidal behaviour more 
completely. This becomes possible because the approach recognizes the fact that the 
way we perceive informs and is just as important as what we perceive about 
phenomena. The fact that some theories and explanations are thus seen as more 
applicable is framed within a paradigm that chooses to view ex'Planations as more or 
less applicable, and not because they are more or less applicable. In fact, the whole 
debate sometimes conducted by researchers to emphasize the 
usefulness/applicability/legitimacy/validity/reliability of their o"\n theories becomes 
quite futile and is, therefore, replaced in the ecosystemic paradigm by an ethic of 
participation. 
All explanations of suicidal behaviour are useful when seen in context and all 
contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of suicidal behaviour. Any explanation 
becomes more or less relevant depending on the specific context in which the behaviour 
exists. This of course originates from a constructivist perspective which realizes that 
whatever we construct is self-referential. What we, therefore, perceive, we construct and 
what we construct, we perceive. Systems are not seen as sociological structures existing 
independently, but as systems organized around a perceived problem, as it is languaged by 
94 
that system Problem-determined systems are, in adherence to Maturana's concepts of 
structure determinism and stmctural coupling, described from within the system, not from 
outside. It was shown that this view informs an ethic of participation where the therapist 
realizes that he/she is a co-constmctor of such a reality. 
With an ethic of participation the therapist/researcher/observer becomes part of and 
participates in that which is observed. No idea or perception pressurises the clinician into 
acting, plainly because it is realized that he/she, even if the ''right" way does exist 
"objectively", does not have access to it. When suicidal behaviour is presented we, as 
clinicians, are part of the problem system The fact that a person presents suicidal 
behaviour as a problem to the clinician makes it as much that ofthe clinician than that of 
the patient. No easy answer or method exists with which we can "rectify" suicidal 
behaviour. Suicidal behaviour therefore becomes a "dilemma"/point of access/sign of 
need for change which could be utilized to get to higher connection in our disjointed 
society. 
No claims to objective facts as informed by the traditional paradigm can be made 
about suicidal behaviour, nor can any single perspective be viewed as the only correct one. 
Clinicians will of course act in ways which fit with a specific context. They will therefore 
sometimes feel the need to act coercively or in any first-order preventative way possible 
when presented with a suicidal individual. They should, however, realize that on higher 
levels they might attain the exact opposite of that which they aim for on a first-order level. 
Through this approach multiple ideas and distinctions evolve through the process of co-
creating a reality to fit a specific system 
7.3 Implications for the Treatment of Suicidal Behaviour 
One of the most important consequences of adopting an ecosystemic approach to the 
study and treatment of suicidal behaviour is the fact that the cause of a particular problem 
as located within the physica~ psychologica~ sociological or a combination of these fields 
becomes irrelevant. All domains of human behaviour are recognized as presenting a 
holistic framework from which suicidal behaviour can be viewed. When "techniques" or 
"methods" are described as "effective" with suicidal individuals, it is not advocated as the 
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only way of working with suicidal behaviour, but serves as a way to (1) give better access 
to the research process and (2) provide an understanding of the researcher's frame of 
reference. Various techniques from different schools of therapy could thus have been 
included in this study, without changing the legitimacy of the project. 
An ecosystemic therapist does not focus on the prevention of suicidal behaviour in a 
direct, linear manner, as is usually done from a medical, intrapsychic or sociological 
perspective. Not only does it, therefore, help the therapist to avoid focusing on a 
reductionist solution to the problem of suicidal behaviour, but it also minimizes the risk of 
perpetuating the suicidal behaviour. 
When suicidal behaviour is understood as a way for the system to conserve its 
autonomy, the therapist is more likely to adopt a respectful as opposed to a blaming stance. 
An ethical approach would not focus on finding the morally ''right" way to do therapy, but 
would centre around a realization that the only ethical way to proceed entails an awareness 
of the therapist's participation in constructing a reality around the presented suicidal 
behaviour. 
7.4 Recommendations for Future Research on Suicidal Behaviour 
The literature on suicidal behaviour is packed with studies which adhere to a realist 
epistemology in which contextual factors and researcher values are mostly excluded so that 
the ''truth" or "right" way of doing therapy with suicidal individuals may be discovered. 
Although this is the case for many research fields, it appears more so with suicidal 
behaviour. Explanations for this observation centre around the troubling nature of suicidal 
behaviour. Suicidal behaviour might at any time result in intentional death, which could 
legally implicate the therapist. An ethical approach that keeps the therapist "objective" in 
order to determine the "right" way ofhandling suicidal behaviour seems to most the safest 
way to proceed and, therefore, stimulates research projects centred in a realist 
epistemology. 
Sociological studies (as were shown in Chapter 3) show that if contextual factors are 
studied, it is generally done from a realist stance. Despite an impressive array of theory 
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and research, suicidal behaviour escapes full prevention. It is, therefore, suggested that 
further research on suicidal behaviour be carried out from an ecosystemic/constructivist 
perspective. Not only would it provide a more holistic understanding of suicidal behaviour 
and provide research that is more applicable to ethical and moral issues, like suicide, but 
also satisfy the outcry for new science research \\hich include an ex-ploration of therapist 
values. 
Benefits from such an approach will include: 
Research relevant to clinical work with ethical issues like suicidal behaviour. 
Societal awareness of the interconnectedness of all systems in ethical and moral 
issues like suicidal behaviour 
An increasing awareness that suicidal behaviour is a metaphor for a whole :p_etwork 
of complex interactions in which the suicidal individual finds him/herself 
Expensive medical efforts at preventing suicidal behaviour from occurring could 
thus be re-evaluated. 
Research, which investigates the values and epistemologies of all health 
professionals and the interconnectedness of it, could be performed. 
7.5 Conclusion 
With an ethic of participation it is realized that those who consume research 
ultimately determine the trustworthiness of it. In this document, however, it was aimed to 
emphasize: 
the complexity of suicidal behaviour, 
the amount of research and theorising as informed by a Newtonian/Cartesian 
epistemology, 
the broad spectrum of systems involved m attaining a more comprehensive 
lmderstanding of the behaviour, 
the importance of including the clinician when dealing with suicidal behaviour, and 
the fact that an ethic of participation as informed by an ecosystemic perspective is 
the most comprehensive way of dealing with the issue of suicidal behaviour. 
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Because this review is based on ecosystemic epistemology, it adopted a radically 
different way of thinking (Auerswald, 1987) which differs from the traditional 
reductionistic conceptualisations which form the basis of most research done on suicidal 
behaviour. One of the strengths of this review is therefore that it took context into acc{)unt. 
Each theory presented was done so in the context of its paradigm as well as against a 
background of varying theories focusing on different aspects of suicidal behaviour. 
By recommending that suicidal behaviour be understood as a socially co-constructed 
reality which exists in a wide range ofvarying communication networks (Capra, 1996) the 
determinist view of suicidal behaviour as residing in the individual only was side-stepped. 
Collaboration between professionals in a non-hierarchical way could, therefore, also be 
propagated and supported by this view. 
The fact that this review is informed by a constructivist as opposed to a realist 
epistemology, showed it to be more applicable to a morally freighted issue like suicide. 
Ethics as it relates to therapeutic behaviour was reconceptualized as an awareness of the 
therapist's participation in whatever is created, and not in finding the ''right" way of doing 
therapy. 
With this dissertation it was not proposed that: 
we do more biological studies to attempt to isolate a "suicidal" gene, or to find the 
exact nerve ending which a serotonin boost could rectify, or that 
we delve even deeper into the unconscious of the individual with the aim of 
extracting the specific psychic conflict into transference that we can then address 
through insight, or that 
we investigate individual problem-solving skills, or any cognitive mindset to 
isolate that specific cognitive deficit which could be altered, or that 
the family system of a suicidal individual be described even when it is in a 
language that emphasize neutrality, circularity and interconnection, or that 
the dynamics of social integration be studied as it leads the individual to commit 
suicide, or that 
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societal values be dissected to understand the individual's suicidal behaviour in 
such a society. 
It was, however, proposed that: 
the suicidal individual as sole focus be dropped from our attempts at understanding 
suicidal behaviour if it does not take the social context of the specific individual 
into account, 
the investigation of ever widening and complex systems be dropped from our 
attempts at understanding suicidal behaviour if it does not take the individual 
context into account, 
the complex attempts at integrating individual suicidal behaviour with all its 
systems be dropped from study if it does not take into account the epistemology of 
the one that observes and describes the specific behaviour, as well as 
post-modem, second-order, qualitative, new science research on suicidal behaviour 
be dropped from our investigations if it does not reiterate the approximate nature of 
knowledge and understanding. 
It is fiuther proposed that we as ecosystemic therapists: 
investigate ourselves as clinicians and researchers in the suicide-business. 
investigate our language and values around suicide. 
investigate how we know what we know about suicide. 
explore the ways in which the language we use when talking about suicidal 
behaviour has progressively informed the behaviour 
lead the way in discussions with other health-professionals around these issues. 
To be truly constructivist requires that we know what our theoretical biases and 
informal theories are. Only then can we as therapists meet our clients in their meaning 
systems and start talking constructively about suicidal behaviour and its implications. This 
dissertation attempted not only to explore those historical biases and their outflows, but 
also to understand how they came about. 
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